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Abstract
Three Essays on Corruption
Sumi Sharma
This dissertation examines the link between market competition and corruption for devel-
oping countries and top income inequality and corruption in the US. The first two chapters
explore the link between firm-level markup and corruption for a global dataset. I test the
hypothesis that high-markup firms are less likely to engage in corruption. To investigate
this relationship, I use firm-level data from World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) for 95
developing countries from 10 manufacturing industries. I find that high markup firms that
operate in less competitive environments are less likely to bribe. These results are robust
across three other measures of competition and two measures of corruption. I also look at
the response rate of these firms to bribe-related question from survey data. I find that higher
markup firms are more likely to be in contact with public officials, less likely to engage in
bribes, and more likely to not answer bribe-related questions. These results highlight the
importance of sample selection bias on the measure of competition and reveals that high
markup rms and government-owned enterprises can determine the likelihood of responses to
corruption-related questions. The third chapter discusses the issue of top income inequality
and corruption within the US. I find a positive correlation between top income inequality
measured by the top 1% and the top 0.1% income share and state-level corruption. Further,
the results are magnified and continue to hold when three instrumental variables are used to
exploit the exogenous variation in income inequality. These results suggest a policy focused
on redistributive income as a means to tackle political corruption in the US.
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1Chapter 1
Markup and Corruption: Evidence of
Firm-Level Data from Developing
Countries
1.1 Introduction
Corruption is one of the main obstacles to economic growth and development of devel-
oping countries. The World Bank estimates the loss caused by corruption to be around 5%
of global GDP, which amounts to $2.6 trillion, and over $1 trillion of that amount paid in
bribes each year.1 Corruption can have a number of negative effects on a firm’s operation
and relationship with government. Therefore, understanding ways to cure corruption is crit-
ical to facilitate fair competition, increase foreign direct investments, and economic growth.
Many economists and policy makers have related market competition as an approach to
dealing with corruption, but the question on the direction and sign is far from settled. This
paper clarifies this relation by investigating market competition by firm-level markup and
exploring the link between corruption. The main findings show that the high-markup firms
operating in less competitive environments tend to decrease the amount paid as bribery.
There are two broad categories of economic theory that suggest competition may be
important for understanding and curing bribery. The first category of research emphasizes
1World Bank, 2005
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competition at the government official level where the officials are responsible for providing
goods and services to citizens or economic agents.2 These studies argue that competition at
the government official level works similarly to a firm facing Bertrand competition, which
eventually drives down prices. If no individual official has monopoly power, economic agents
can freely choose an official to work with in obtaining permits or licenses. This drives the
equilibrium price for bribes down to zero (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). The other category of
research focuses on competition at the level of economic agents who are seeking goods and
services, such as licenses or permits, from the government official.3 These studies indicate
that increased competition among economic agents drives profit to zero, which leaves little
surplus for extortion by the corrupt official. This paper focuses on the second strand of
literature by looking at whether a firm’s market power (or level of competition) has an effect
on corruption.
Most of the empirical research at the cross-country level find a negative association be-
tween the degree of competition and corruption. The most common approach is to use
perception-based corruption indexes (e.g., Transparency International Corruption Index and
Political Risk Service’s International Risk Guide Indicators) and indirect measures of com-
petition (e.g., ratio of imports of GDP to total GDP and Economic Freedom indexes of the
Heritage Foundation) (For instance, see Ades and Di Tella (1999), Bliss and Di Tella (1997),
Emerson (2006), Treisman (2000a)). There are several limitations for these cross-country
studies that rely on broad aggregate indicators. First, this type of data is not adequately
suited for within country, industry, and firm-level analysis and has limited coverage. In
particular, there are many economic differences across industries and firms that determine
the incidence of bribes and level of competition, which cannot be controlled for with cross-
country data. Second, the Corruption Perception Indexes are based on expert opinion that
might not accurately portray the true corruption level. By contrast, data obtained through
surveys reflect the firm’s actual experiences on corruption and provide valuable details on
other firm-level determinants of corruption. It is, therefore, interesting to assess whether
firm’s operating environment can shape the firm’s decision to bribe after these firm-level
2see Rose-Ackerman (1978), Shleifer and Vishny (1993)
3see Ades and Di Tella (1999), Bliss and Di Tella (1997), Emerson (2006), Treisman (2000a)
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characteristics are controlled in the empirical model.
More recent studies using firm-level survey data find a positive association between mar-
ket competition and the amount of bribes paid. My research shows only two other published
papers on this topic by Alexeev and Song (2013) and Diaby and Sylwester (2015). Both
papers measure market competition by several measures, including number of competitors
and markup. My research is closely related to these papers but differs in the following ways.
In contrast to these studies that use profit-to-sales markup (i.e., profit margin), this pa-
per estimates firm-level markup as a ratio of the output elasticities of intermediate inputs
to the intermediate input’s expenditure share. One of the more recent and leading paper
by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) shows the precise identification strategy to generate
firm-specific markups for a cost-minimizing firm.
More specifically, markup can be identified following three basic steps (details section
3.2.2) which can be summarized as follows. First, this paper estimates several specifications
of production functions and generates the beta coefficients (or output elasticities) for inter-
mediate inputs. Second, the revenue shares of intermediate inputs are calculated directly
from the survey data.4 Third, markup is then estimated as a ratio of output elasticities in
intermediate inputs (step 1) to revenue shares of the intermediate inputs (step 2). Thus, this
markup ratio can be used to interpret the pricing power of the firm where a high markup
means stronger market power or the firms faces less market competition.
An advantage to estimating markup this way is that, unlike the profit-to-sales markup
that requires information on profitability and operating costs, this approach only needs
information on at least one freely adjustable input which is readily available in the data.
This, in turn, makes the markup ratio estimate less noisy because it is directly estimated
and does not rely on price information (Cassiman and Vanormelingen (2013)). In addition,
the assumption that firms are profit maximizers for profit-to-sales markup may not be valid
because the sample covers developing countries where firms are less motivated to maximize
profits and more likely to hire excess labor (Azmat et al. (2012)). The optimal input demand,
4De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) use the revenue share and the expenditure share interchangeably. This
paper calculates expenditure share as the ratio of total cost of intermediate inputs to total revenue (or total
sales).
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therefore, as required by profit maximization condition may not be satisfied.
This paper uses a rich dataset from the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey (henceforth,
WBES) that covers 10 main manufacturing sectors from 95 developing countries. Corrup-
tion is measured by a sales-based bribe measure and a contract-based bribe measure. The
sales-based bribe measure is defined as the firms payment of bribes to a government official
in order “to get things done”, while the contract-based bribe measure is defined as the firms
payment to obtain a government contract. To clearly understand the competition-corruption
link at the firm-level, the models control for the firm’s age, ownership status, location (cap-
ital), and export status. Since almost 75% of the firms report zero bribe payment for both
variables, I use a tobit model for the main estimation. However, probit, logit, and linear
probability models are also used for robustness. The main results can be summarized as fol-
lows. Based on an unbalanced pooled cross-section of 22,000 observations from 2006-2016,
the tobit models suggest there is a negative and statistically significant relationship be-
tween low levels of market competition (high markups) and corruption. For the sales-based
bribe measure, a 10 percent increase in markup decreases the amount of bribes paid by 0.5
percent. Similarly, for the contract-based bribe measure, a 10 percent increase in markup
decreases the amount of bribes paid by 0.9 percent. The positive (negative) relationship
between a stronger (weaker) product market competition and corruption continues to hold
when alternative measures of competition are tested. Both the firm’s reported number of
competitors and the firm’s informal competition status show a positive and statistically sig-
nificant relationship with corruption. Overall, the results reconfirm the positive (negative)
link between stronger (weaker) market competition and corruption that previous firm-level
empirical research has shown.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses past theory and empirical research on
the relationship between competition and corruption. Section 3 outlines the WBES data set
with summary statistics. Section 3 also explores markup and the different bribe variables
in detail. Section 4 provides an empirical analysis for the tobit, probit, and logit estimates.
Section 5 presents the results and section 6 concludes with a brief policy implication.
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1.2 Literature Review
1.2.1 Theory Background
Corruption is defined as the act whereby government officials extract rents from indi-
viduals and businesses for service provided. Corruption increases transaction costs for firms
(Rose-Ackerman, 1978) and becomes more expensive than a government tax due to the need
for secrecy (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). As a consequence, some firms are reluctant to invest
in highly corrupt countries, which reduces foreign direct investments and economic growth
in the long-run.5 Therefore, understanding the root causes of corruption are important to
policy makers.
The theory between product market competition and corruption remains ambiguous with
respect to its sign and direction. There are mainly two strands of literature that suggest
that competition is in fact important for addressing corruption. The first strand models
competition at the government official level who are responsible for providing goods and
services to economic agents (Rose-Ackerman (1978), Shleifer and Vishny (1993)). Rose-
Ackerman (1978) was the first to suggest competition at the official level as a way of reducing
corruption. Subsequently, other models where the government official remains in-charge of
providing access to the market, license, or permits etc., emerged (Shleifer and Vishny (1993)).
The main idea of these models is that increasing the number of government officials who
are in-charge of providing goods and services reduces the amount of bribes demanded. The
models work similar to a firm facing competition that observes a reduction in prices. Shleifer
and Vishny (1993) provide an example on how this works, which eventually eliminates bribe
payments (p. 607):
“A citizen can obtain a U.S. passport without paying a bribe. The likely reason for this is
that if an official asks him for a bribe, he will go to another window or another city. Because
collusion between several agents is difficult, bribe competition between the providers will
drive the level of bribes down to zero.”
Alternatively, Bliss and Di Tella (1997) argue that it is the corrupt officials who have an
incentive to drive less efficient firms out of market, and therefore the official’s main problem
5For instance, see Wei (2000), Svensson (2005), Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995)
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is to maximize the expected bribe revenue per firm. More specifically, the authors consider
the number of firms endogenous to the model and show that greater competition increases
corruption as firms seek to gain advantages over their competitors. They use lower overhead
costs to proxy for one of the “deep competition” parameters and show a significant reduction
in number of firms in equilibrium.
The other strand identifies competition faced by the economic agents who have to deal
with corrupt government officials regularly. Economic agents might need to engage in cor-
ruption (pay bribes) to obtaining a license, permit, etc (see, for instance, Ades and Di Tella
(1999), Bliss and Di Tella (1997)). Increased competition for economic agents, in this case,
eliminates excess profits which reduces corruption. In other words, perfect competition aids
to control corruption since bribes are harder to extract when profits are zero. Alternatively,
Ades and Di Tella (1999) provide a scenario where this relationship might be ambiguous
since less competition, measured by the number of firms, increases the economic rent en-
joyed by the firm. At the same time, the public is keener and more likely to spend resources
to monitor the officials which, in turn, results in less corruption.
Emerson (2006) argues that a government agent acts alone to demand graft from firms in
order to limit the number of firms in the market. However, the government official is subject
to a “detection technology” that increases with number of firms and bribe payments. Emer-
son obtains two stable equilibria: high corruption and low competition, and low corruption
and high competition, and concludes that “competition is antithetical to corruption”. Other
studies argue that officials can restrict entry to a market and extract rent accordingly (For
instance, see Campos et al. (2010), Dutta and Mishra (2004),Aidt and Dutta (2008)). These
models treat the number of competitors and degree of corruption as jointly determined and
focus on the causality from corruption to competition.
1.2.2 Empirical Background
Most of the empirical research finds a negative relationship between competition and
corruption, although the direction of causality is unclear. Ades and Di Tella (1999) use a
cross-country study to show that level of rents and market structure determines the level of
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corruption. They show that countries with less market competition (or higher rents) tend
have higher corruption. They proxy for competition by share of imports to total GDP, share
of fuel and mineral exports in total exports, and distance to the world’s major exporters in
the 2SLS model to deal with endogeneity.
Alternatively, for a cross-country setting, Emerson (2006) show a negative link between
corruption (measured by bribes) and industrial competition. The direction is from corruption
to competition in this case. Competition is measured by two indexes: rankings based on
business leaders collected by Economic Freedom indexes of the Heritage Foundation and an
index based on trade policy, foreign direct investment, property rights, etc., obtained from
the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness rankings.
The aforementioned papers rely on a small country-level sample with perception-based
corruption indexes. For example, Ades and Di Tella (1999) uses corruption data from Busi-
ness International and World Competitiveness Reports and Emerson (2006) uses corruption
data from Transparency International and World Audit Organization. By using a country-
level indicator for corruption, these studies assume homogeneous levels of corruption for
different firms and industries, which may or may not be accurate. In addition, these indexes
assume only one type of corruption and it is impossible to identify the type of corruption,
such as bribery by government officials, which the firm engages in. Corrupt officials may
demand a bribe or the firm may pay for a bribe to get things done, both of which will
not show up in the aggregate data. Likewise, country-level indicators for competition may
not accurately portray the firm’s competitive environment in a given country or industry.
There could be many firm-level differences across industries within the same country that
determine the level of bribes and competition, which need to be controlled in analyzing the
competition-corruption link.
This paper complements the more recent empirical development in this literature that
relies on firm-level survey data. My research shows only two other published papers on this
topic Alexeev and Song (2013) and Diaby and Sylwester (2015); both papers find a positive
association between market competition and the amount of bribes paid. Alexeev and Song
(2013) use five direct measures of competition: number of competitors; firm-level markup;
an index to customer reaction of price increase; national and local market share; and the
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Herfindahl-Heirschman Index (HHI). They instrument the degree of competition by U.S.
capital-labor ratios to control for endogeneity.
Overall, they find a positive association between bribes and different measures of com-
petition. However, the results mostly hold for number of competitors but are not robust to
other measures of competition. For example, markup is only significant after controlling for
endogeneity in the 2SLS model; other measures such as the local and national shares and
the HHI are not significant at all, although show the correct signs.6
Alexeev and Song (2013) discuss drawbacks to using each measures of competition in their
paper ; however, I briefly outline the reasons for markups. First, they estimate price markup
as the “difference between total market value of production and the firm’s operating costs
to the firm’s total market value of production” (p.163). This measure may be inconsistent
as firms might not include the cost of bribes in total costs. Furthermore, the sample covers
developing countries where firms are less motivated to maximize profits and more likely to
hire excess labor as Azmat et al. (2012) point out in their paper. This raise questions about
their approach for generating markups.
Recently, a closely related paper by Diaby and Sylwester (2015) also finds a positive re-
lationship between market competition and corruption for post-communist countries. They
include the local number of competitors as a proxy for competition in the main model.
However, they also include other measures of market competition such as: national com-
petitors; markup; competitive pressure from imports; and the hypothetical question:“what
would happen to firm sale should the firm raise its price by 10%?”.7
Both these papers include markup as a measure of competition but are unable to find a
statistically significant relationship between markup and bribes. An important difference in
this paper is that markup is calculated as the ratio of the output elasticity of intermediate
6The authors deal with reverse causality with a 2SLS and second stage GMM model. For the 2SLS,
only markup is significant at the 5% level and number of competitors is significant at the 15% level. For the
second stage GMM model, only number of competitors is significant at the 5% level and markup is significant
at the 15% level.
7Diaby and Sylwester (2015) instrument the number of competitors with: questions such as “what if
suppliers raises the price, would firm still purchase from them?”; sources of attracting new customers; and
whether the firm is a trade association. They also measure competition by anti-competitive trade practices,
domestic competition in firm’s decision to innovate, competition from foreign firms, extent of domestic
competition in firm’s decision to cut production, and competition from foreign firms.
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inputs from the production function to share of expenditure of the intermediate inputs. This
markup estimate is a good indicator of competition because it is not dependent on firm’s
operating costs as used to calculate profitability. More importantly, the instrumental variable
used by Alexeev and Song (2013), which is the U.S. industry capital- labor ratio, is considered
the same across all countries. This assumption might not be accurate because firm-level fixed
effects parameters can differ by country. In addition, the firms competitiveness can also be
determined by institutions in a given country.
According to Sequeira and Djankov (2010), firms engage in two forms of corruption when
seeking a service. First, the collusive (or cost-reducing) corruption that “emerges when pub-
lic officials and private agents collude to share rents generated by the illicit transactions”
(p.12). Second, coercive corruption (or cost-increasing) that emerges when a public bureau-
crat demands a fee from a private agent to gain access to public services. Coercive corruption
increases the price of goods and services (above the official price) as firms have to pay both
a bribe and the cost.8 Alexeev and Song (2013) argue that cost-reducing corruption is more
likely to happen with an increase in market competition, where firms are willing to pay a
bribe to lower fixed or variable costs.
1.3 Data
The data used for this study comes from the Enterprise Surveys of the World Bank
(WBES). The WBES contains general firm-level information on degree of competition,
business-government relations, corruption, finance, labor, and productivity. The WBES
uses a stratified sampling procedure and covers different sectors from various countries, sec-
tors, and years. For the manufacturing industry, establishments with five or more employees
located in major metropolitan areas of the country are surveyed.
The major advantage of the WBES data is that it provides specific information about
representative firms that operate in a particular country. In other words, as opposed to
8Shleifer and Vishny (1993) define collusive corruption as corruption without theft and coercive corruption
(also known as extortionary corruption) as corruption with theft. In the case of coercive corruption, citizens
pay bribes on goods and services they entitled too, as compared to collusive corruption where bribes are
paid on goods and services that are illegal.
Sumi Sharma 10
the indexes based purely on expert perception, the surveys are administered face-to-face
with managing directors, business owners, accountants, and other relevant staff members
who have firsthand experience on issues such as corruption and competition. Although
corruption data from the WBES have been extensively used in empirical literature, the
measure still faces several criticisms. A major concern with the survey data is the reliability
of self-reporting values and the amount of non-responses from firms. Both of these issues
arise because corruption and business-government relationships remain a sensitive issue in
many countries.
The World Bank acknowledges these issues and takes appropriate steps to ensure confi-
dentiality and accuracy in the data. The government is not directly involved in gathering
the data, but rather the World Bank coordinates with other private and local contractors
to conduct the surveys.9 In addition, respondents are not required to provide any informa-
tion that could identify them or the firm. Despite these criticisms, the micro-level data is
clearly of interest since most firms interact with public officials at this level, which can tell
us exactly how firms’ competitive environment affects the likelihood to bribe. The data also
provides detailed information on various firm-level characteristics which aids in controlling
for unobserved heterogeneity on the corruption measure. Furthermore, several papers attest
the importance and accuracy of the WBES data. Fisman and Svensson (2007) cite “with
appropriate survey methods and interview techniques” (p.68) firm managers are able to pro-
vide a detail and accurate response to corruption related questions. Similarly, Olken and
Pande (2012) cite “since survey-based data on bribes can be easily replicated, it is one of
the only areas where consistent measurement is now being carried out across countries and
over time” (p. 483).
The data covered in this study includes 95 developing countries and covers 10 main man-
ufacturing industries from 2006 to 2016.10 For most cases, I report results based on 3,722 to
22,482 observations. The difference arises because the sample varies according to the mea-
surement of competition and bribe variables. For markup, the total observations is 22,482.
The manufacturing industries have been classified according to the major 2 digit ISIC code.
9For more information on methodology visit www.enterprisesurveys.org/methodology
10Sample updated September 2016.
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In particular, the industries are: food and beverages; textiles, leathers, garments; products,
leather, and footwear; wood and furniture; chemicals and pharmaceuticals; non-metallic and
plastics; metals, machinery and equipment; electronics; auto and auto components; retail;
and other manufacturing.
Table 1.1 provides a summary statistics for key variables in the WBES 2006-2016 panel
data. The average informal payment calculated from the sales-based bribe variable is 1.61.
Almost 90 % of the firms have some kind of private ownership. The average age of the firm
is 19 years and about 50 % of the firms are located in the capital city.
1.3.1 Bribes
Since the primary focus is on how firm-level markup affects corruption in developing
countries, defining corruption variables are important. Corruption is measured by bribes
as percentage of total sales (bribes sales) and bribes as percentage of a contract value
(bribes contract). These measures approximate the firm’s behavior and government’s rent-
seeking behavior where public officials expect informal payments “to get this done” with
regards to custom, taxes, licenses, regulations, services, etc. Specifically, the data for these
indexes comes from the two questions respectively, “on average, what percentage of total an-
nual sales or total estimated value of bribe payment, do establishments like this one pay in
informal payments and gifts to public officials for this purpose?” , and“when establishments
like this one do business with government, what percent of the contract value would be paid
in informal payments or gifts to secure the contract?”.
For the sales-based bribe variable, data can be obtained from two responses: the percent-
age a firm pays as an informal gift and the total annual amount of bribes paid informally.
If the respondent reports the annual amount rather than percentages, the LCU amount is
divided by total sales (*100) to convert it to percentage. Two of these indexes are merged
to create one sales-based bribe (bribes sales) index which reports the maximum value from
these two responses. This increases the total observations from 18,741 to 22,482.11
I also construct two dummy variables: sales dummy and contract dummy. Both these
11In most cases, I use the merged value for sales-based bribe index but the results still hold for just the
individual measure of bribe sales.
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variables take a value one to represent firms who responded with a positive value for sales-
based bribe and contract-based bribe index, respectively, and zero otherwise. Answers that
state “do not know” or “refuse to answer” are changed to missing values. Answers “does
not apply” or “not applicable” is replaced with zero.
The average firm pays about 1.61% of their total sales as informal payments or gifts to
government officials. Madagascar has the highest amount of bribe payment at 9.40 % of
total sales while Israel has the lowest bribe payment at 0.20 % of total sales. Similarly, Israel
has the lowest percentage of bribe of contract, valued at 0.41% while Philippines has the
highest at 11.80%. The average firm pays about 2.94 % bribe as a percentage of contract
value.
To validate the use of these measures of corruption, I consider a country-level measure of
Control of Corruption(CC) from the World Governance Indicator (WGI). The WGI indexes
are based on numerous individual data sources obtained from citizens, surveys from public
and private non government organizations, and assessment of expert’s opinions.12 The indices
capture experts opinions “on the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain,
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as capture of the state by elites
and private interests.” This index ranges from -2.5 (more corruption) to 2.5 (less corruption)
and for the countries sampled the average CC is -1.52. I generate a cross-country average for
the WGI data from 2006 through 2016 and check its correlation with an average of bribes
across all firms in each country. The correlation between average bribe sales and average
WGI is -0.45 at 1% level of significance. The correlation between bribe contract and average
WGI is - 0.42 at 10% level of significance. These results suggest that our data of firm-level
responses is highly correlated with other cross country measures.
1.3.2 Markup
This section introduces the methodology used to calculate markups from production
function and the survey data. The first step describes the process to obtain coefficients from
the production function and the second step demonstrates the calculation for markups (µit).
12For more detailed information, visit http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/
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Hall (1988) used data on total inputs and total output to calculate sector-level markups
from production functions. In his seminal paper, Hall stated that under perfect competition
input revenue share is equal to input cost share.13 The difference between the two can be
identified as firm-level markup. However, this methodology faces problems with identifying
total costs and marginal costs for the markup estimation (Cassiman and Vanormelingen
(2013)).
The solution recently suggested by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) is to include an
assumption that firms are cost-minimizers and choose at least one freely adjustable input.
They calculate markup as the ratio of output elasticity of an input(s) to the total expendi-
ture share of the input(s) and relate these to firm level export status. An advantage to this
approach is that is relatively easy to estimate firm specific markup without requiring any in-
formation on the market structure and the firm’s input demand (De Loecker and Warzynski,
2012). One difficulty, however, with this approach is addressing the unobserved productiv-
ity shocks of the production function. I do not investigate that in this paper because the
WBES does not provide a dynamic panel data structure needed to calculate total factor
productivities.
To estimate markups, I follow the recent work of De Loecker and Warzynski (2012).
Consider the following cost minimization problem faced by firm i located in country c at
time t:
minimize
Nit,Mit,Kit
witNit + ritKit + p
m
itMit
subject to Fit(Nit,Mit, Kit) ≥ Qit,
(1.1)
where Nit,Mit, Kit represents labor, intermediate inputs, and capital for firm i in period t
respectively and wit, p
m
it , rit denote the wage rate, the price of intermediate inputs, and the
rental price of capital respectively. F(.) denotes the production function which is continuous
and twice differentiable with respect to all of its arguments. Qit is the total output of the
firm. The Lagrange function associated with equation (1.1) can be written as:
L(Nit, Kit,Mit, λit) = witNit + ritKit + pmitMit + λit[Qit − Fit(Nit,Mit, Kit)] (1.2)
13Input revenue share is calculated as the ratio of total cost of the input to the total revenue. The input
cost share is calculated as the ratio of total cost of an input to the marginal cost times the total output. For
details see Cassiman and Vanormelingen (2013)
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The first order condition for intermediate inputs is denoted by:
∂L
∂Mit
= pmit − λit
∂Fit
∂Mit
= 0 (1.3)
After rearranging equation (1.3) and multiplying both sides by Mit
Qit
, the equation takes
the following form:
pmit
1
λit
Mit
Qit
=
∂FitMit
∂MitQit
(1.4)
The final step is to consider Pit as the price of the final product sold and λit =
∂L
∂Qit
as
the marginal cost (mcit) for a given level of output. Given markup is defined as the ratio of
price over marginal cost, i.e. µit =
Pit
mcit
= Pit
λit
, we can rewrite equation (1.4) as:
Pit
Pit
pmit
1
λit
Mit
Qit
=
∂FitMit
∂MitQit
(1.5)
or markup (µit) can be denoted as:
µit = θ
m
it (α
m
it )
−1 (1.6)
where θmit =
∂Fit
∂Mit
Mit
Qit
is the output elasticity of intermediate input and αmit =
pmitMit
PitQit
is the
expenditure share of intermediate input in total sales.
The estimation of firm-level markup relies on two factors. First, it is important to
consider a cost-minimizing firm and choose an input that is free of any adjustment cost.
Therefore, it is critical to correctly estimate the output elasticities for intermediate inputs
from the production function. Output elasticities can be calculated for both labor and
capital; however, I choose to use intermediate inputs as labor is not freely adjusted in
developing countries. This is mainly true in state-owned enterprises and in the presence of
unions ((Azmat et al., 2012), Shleifer and Vishny (1994)). Firms in these countries flexibly
optimize the purchase of intermediate inputs rather than labor and capital. In addition,
depending on the country, the WBES provides at maximum 2-3 years of data and firms are
not consistently linked across time through an unique firm id. This makes it difficult to
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calculate output elasticities for capital which is considered a dynamic input in the literature.
Second, it is important to collect data on expenditure share for intermediate inputs and the
total sales (or revenue) for the firm. This is readily available at the WBES.
The econometric procedure to generate markups using production function consists of
two steps which I outline in the following sections.
1.3.3 Identify output elasticities
I start by assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function of the following form:
Yit = AitN
βn
it K
βk
it M
βm
it (1.7)
where Yit is total real output (sales), Ait is total factor productivity, Nit is human capital,
Kit is capital, and Mit is intermediate inputs for firm i at time t. The WBES defines total
sales as the value of all annual sales, including manufactured goods and goods the establish-
ment buys for trading. Capital is constructed from balance sheet information and defined as
net book value, which is the sum of machinery and equipment (including transportation and
installation costs) minus depreciation accumulated since the date of purchase. An alterna-
tive estimator for capital-the answer from the manager’s evaluation for the firm’s equipment,
land and building if sold on the market - is used when necessary. Labor or manpower costs
is measured as labor adjusted by human capital and is defined as the total annual wages
and all annual benefits, including food, transport, and social security (i.e. pensions, medical
insurance, and unemployment insurance). Intermediate inputs are the sum of annual cost of
electricity, communications services, raw materials, intermediate goods used in production,
fuel, transportation of goods -excluding fuel, water, and other cost of production. Since the
aforementioned variables are in local currency, all variables have been exchanged to U.S.
Dollars using World Development Indicators.14 The data are then deflated using GDP price
deflator for the United States with 2005 as the base year.15
Estimating equation (1.7) with OLS leads to biased results if the inputs in the production
14WDI indicator code: PA.NUS.FCRF
15World Bank indicator
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function are endogenous to the model. Marschak and Andrews (1944) noted that inputs in
the production function are not independently chosen, but are determined by the character-
istics of firms. The endogeneity problem arises because of productive factor unobservable to
the econometrician, but observable to the firm which affects the input demand. More recent
literature suggests using control function approaches (see Ackerberg et al. (2015) for detail).
These literatures suggest that under profit maximization, observed investment (Olley and
Pakes (1992)) and intermediate materials (Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)) can be inverted
and used as a proxy to solve for the correlation between unobserved productivity shock and
input levels. However, due to the lack of good instrumental variables and dynamic panel, I
rely on fixed effects to get consistent coefficients on labor, capital, and intermediate inputs.
To obtain the estimates of output elasticities, I rely on Cobb-Douglas (CD), Constant
Returns to Scale (CRTS), and Translog production functions. For each case I use a gross
output (revenue) production function with two variable inputs without adjustment costs.
Markup can be obtained from either labor or intermediate inputs. However, I use interme-
diate inputs since there is evidence of excess employment and wages in state-owned firms for
social stability (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1994)).
Based on the discussion above, I estimate the following production functions using Or-
dinary Least Sqaures (OLS) for the full sample:
Model 1. Cobb-Douglas (CD) Production Function
yit = βnnit + βkkit + βmmit + δc + δj + δt + it (1.8)
where yit is the (log) real total sales for firm i at time t. nit, kit, and mit represent the
(log) inputs of human capital adjusted for labor (wage bill), (log) real capital, and (log) real
intermediate inputs respectively for firm i at time t. δc, δc, δt is the country, industry, and
year fixed-effects that captures productivity and it accounts for random errors.
Model 2 Constant Returns to Scale (CRTS) Production Function
With the CRTS production function, I examine whether a proportional change in input
(constant factor increase) leads to a change in output. I impose the following restriction to
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equation (1.8)
βnnit + βkkit + βmmit = 1 (1.9)
Model 3. Translog Production Function
I use a translog form for labor and capital which allows me to diverge from just having
a linear term to having both a linear and a quadratic term.
yit = βnnit + βkkit + βmmit + βnnn
2
it + βkkk
2
it + βnknitkit + δc + δj + δt + it (1.10)
where βn, βk, βm are the first derivatives; βnn, βkk are own second derivatives and βnk is the
cross second derivatives. Other variables remain the same as in equation (1.8).
Table 1.2 provides summary statistics for the variables included in the production func-
tion. Before estimating the production function, I have eliminated questionable outliers for
the main production parameters: output, capital, intermediate inputs, and labor. Firms
with large absolute values after the log transformations and observations that result in zero,
negative, or missing values for the production parameters are eliminated from the sample.
In addition, the top 1% and bottom 1% have been dropped from the sample.
Table 1.3 shows the results of estimating the CRTS production function (Model 1) for 10
main manufacturing industries, including retail and wholesale trade, with country and year
fixed-effects. The manufacturing industries have been classified according to the 2 digit ISIC
code. To increase observations per group, smaller industries are merged with larger industries
(for e.g., leather is merged with garments and textiles). To allow industry differences in the
production parameters, I run regressions for each industry separately and include country
and year fixed-effects. All of the estimated parameters are significant at a 1% level. The
coefficients on intermediate inputs are mostly stable between industries and fluctuate from
0.65 for metals, machineries, and electronics to 0.59 for textiles, garments, and auto industry.
Table 1.4 shows the coefficients of the production function for Model 1-3 with country
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and year fixed- effects.16 All of the estimated parameters are significant at a 1% level and
the estimated factor coefficients are close to the known input shares. The results confirm
that the manufacturing industry is labor intensive in developing countries. For the whole
sample, the output elasticity of labor (human capital) is 0.313 for CD production function
and 0.318 for CRTS production function. The output elasticity of capital is 0.06 for both
the CD and CRTS model. For the CD production function, a 10% increase in capital is
associated with an increase of 0.6% in output. The output elasticity of intermediate inputs
is 0.62 for CD and CRTS production function. This implies that, for the CD production
function, an increase of 10% in intermediate inputs is associated with an increase of 6.2% in
output. To sum, approximately 32% of the production output is allocated to human capital,
62% to intermediate inputs, and 6% to capital. The estimated parameters are similar in
columns (3) and (4) which represent the results from estimating the Translog and Kmenta
production function.
1.3.4 Identify markups
The next step is to calculate markup as µit =
βm
αit
from the models estimated above. Bm
is the scalar coefficient for intermediate inputs obtained in Model 1-3 and αit is the share
of expenditure for intermediate inputs in total sales. The interpretation of a high markup
of firm is that the firm has high market power or faces a less market competition. It also
suggests that the firm is able to charge a higher markup compared with a lower-markup
firm that faces several competitors in the market. For statistical estimation of markups, I
have eliminated high leverage points that is, for log markup, values below -0.39 and higher
than 5 have been eliminated from the sample. In order to ensure the sample of the firms
are representative of the true population, I re-estimated the sample by replacing values less
than -0.39 with -0.39 and values higher than 5 with 5. The results are comparable. The
mean markup is 2.03 from the 3 models and the median is around 1.27.
Table 1.5 shows the differences between the markup values across industries. Both the
mean and the median values fall in the reasonable 1-2 range. The three industries with
16Results are similar when industry fixed-effects are added to the model.
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higher markups are wood and furniture (1.38), textiles, garments, and leather (1.33), and
electronics (1.24). Conversely, the three industries with lowest markups (at the level) are
the auto and its components (0.97), non-metallic and plastic materials (1.21), and chemicals
and pharmaceuticals (1.22). Note: for empirical analysis I use markup estimates from the
industry-level CRTS model.
To ensure validity and robustness to the markup estimates, I regress the firm’s reported
intervals for number of competitors on markup. Table 1.6 reports the results using an OLS
regression with country, industry, and year fixed-effects. This regression will shed light on
whether an increase in the number of competitors leads to lower markups. If the results
hold, the markup estimate is consistent because higher markup indicates less competition in
the market. The results confirm the hypothesis that firms facing competitors greater than
two, but less than five, and greater than five see a decrease in markup. These findings are
statistically significant at the 1% level.
1.3.5 Other Controls
Following previous firm-level studies, I control for various firm-level characteristics that
can influence the relationship between competition and corruption. Batra et al. (2003)
find that private firms are more likely to bribe, pay a higher revenue share as bribes, and
more likely to consider bribe as an obstacle. Similarly, firms with large private, foreign, or
government shares could face different bribe environments in dealing with public officials.
Hence, I include a dummy variable equal to one for firms with more than 50% of percentage
of ownership by private domestic individuals, companies or organizations (prishare), equal
to two for percentage of firm owned by private foreign domestic individuals, companies or
organizations (forshare), and zero for more than 50% ownership by government or state
(govshare). In my sample, 93% of the firms have some degree of prishare, 12% of firms with
some degree of forshare and 2% of firms with some degree of govshare.
Age is calculated as the logarithmic difference between the survey year and and the year
in which the establishment started its operation. The suggested direction of age is mixed in
the literature. On the one hand, young firms could pay more bribes relative to older firms to
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enter the market. Alternatively, older firms could pay more bribes compared to young firms
to remain in the market.
I also include a variable on export status, where exporter is a dummy variable representing
a value one if the sum of indirect exports (sold domestically to third party that exports
products) and direct exports is greater than 50%, with national sales as the benchmark.
Studies have shown that firms that export internationally, as compared to domestic sales,
might be more prone to the government rent extraction to avoid customs or taxes. Lastly,
I control for the capital city since most government offices are located in the city center.
capital is a dummy variable with a value of one for firm’s located in the capital city. All
else equal, I expect a positive relation between capital and bribes which indicates the firm’s
influence on local government officials.
1.4 Methodology
The literature on the effects of competition on corruption has generated concerns as the
cross-country studies do not address potential omitted biases. To overcome these problems, I
estimate the following probit model using firm-level controls that could determine corruption.
An advantage of using the firm-level data is that it sheds light on how a firm’s operating
environment, within a specific industry or country, can effect the firm’s decision to bribe
government official. The probit model is estimated with maximum likelihood methods and
takes the following form:
P (Bribeit = 1) = P (β1markupit + β2Xit + δc + δt + δj + it > 0) (1.11)
where Bribeit represents dummy variables for the two corruption indicators: sale-based bribe
measure (bribe sales) and contract-based bribe measure (contract sales). More specifically,
the dummy variable for the sales-based bribe measure (dummy sales) represent a value of
one if firm i in country c at time t reported a positive value for bribe indicated as percentage
of total sales, while the dummy variable for the contract-based (dummy contract) measure
represents a value of one if firm i in country c at time t reported a positive value for bribes
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indicated as percentage of contract value. The main independent variable is markup which
is estimated as the ratio of output elasticity of intermediate inputs to the total share of
expenditure on intermediate inputs. The model also controls for firm-level characteristics
(Xit) that could determine bribe incidences. These firm-level controls include firm’s age,
export status, ownership status, and capital. In addition, the equations include country,
industry, and year-fixed effects (denoted as δc, δj, and δt, respectively).
Since the sample includes 95 different countries from four continents, the inclusion of
country-fixed effects controls for countrywide factors- country’s legal system, legal origin,
rule of law, and regulation of various economic activities that could influence corruption
(Treisman (2000a)). The inclusion of industry-fixed effects is to control for the exogenous
variation in firm productivity that can influence the relationship between markups and bribe
payments. In the same vein, the inclusion of time fixed-effects is to capture any macroeco-
nomic trend or policies of a country that could potentially influence the firm’s intention to
bribe. All three models use robust standard errors clustered at the country-industry level.
This is to allow errors to be correlated within the same country and industry. Equation
(1.11) is also estimated using logit and linear probability model for robustness.
Given that almost 75 % of the firms report zero informal payments for the corruption
indexes, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) results can lead to biased estimates. Therefore,
I also estimate the following Tobit mode with a lower bound set to zero:
bribeit = β1markupit + β2Xit + δc + δt + δj + it (1.12)
In equation 1.12, the dependent variable represents the percentage of total annual sales or
total estimated value of bribe payment (sales based bribe) and the percent of the contract
value paid in informal payments to secure the contract (contract based bribe). All other
right hand side variables remain the same as in equation 1.11.
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1.5 Results
This section illustrates the econometric analysis of the relationship between firm-level
markup and corruption, while controlling for firm’s age, location, ownership status, and
export status. First, I estimate whether high markup firms operating in less competitive
environments are less likely to engage in corruption using the probit, logit, and linear prob-
ability model in table 1.7. If the firm’s competition determines the amount of bribes paid,
high markup firms (less competition) should be negatively correlated with bribes. More
specifically, the results of equation 1.11 are reported and include country, industry, and year
fixed-effects. All of these estimations include standard errors clustered at country-industry
levels. The dependent variable in columns 1-3 are a binary assigned a value of one if the
firm responded with a positive value for the sales-based bribe measure, while the dependent
variable in columns 4-6 is a binary with a value of one if the firm responded with a positive
value for contract-based bribe measure. Columns 1 and 4 report the marginal effects of the
probit model. Columns 2 and 5 report the point estimate of the logit model, while columns
3 and 6 represent the coefficient estimates of the linear probability model. As expected,
the coefficients of markup are negative and statistically significant at the 5% levels in all
columns. The results show that high markup firms, compared to less markup firms, are less
likely to bribe as measured by both the sales-based bribe and contract-based bribe measure.
Second, in table 1.8, I look at the results for the tobit model with country-industry
clustered standard errors. Specifically, equation 1.12 is estimated with firm-level controls
and fixed effects. The estimates in column 1 and 3 include markup as the only independent
variable with country, industry, and year fixed-effects. Columns 2 and 4 add other firm-level
controls. The dependent variable in columns 1-2 is bribes measured as percentages of total
sales (bribe sales) and the dependent variable in column 3-4 is bribe measured as percentages
of contract value. These variables are in logged terms. The results show that high markup
firms decrease the incidence of bribes paid. For the sales-based bribe measure, a 10% increase
in markup decreases the incidence to bribe by 0.5 percent, which is statistically significant
at the 1% level. In other words, the elasticity of the sales-based bribe measure with respect
to markup is -0.05. The results are similar for the contract-based bribe measure in columns
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3-4. A 10% increase in markup decreases the incidence to bribe for the contract-based
bribe measure by 0.9 percent. The result is statistically significant at 1 % level. As Beck
and Maher (1986) explain, the model for contract-bribes can be compared to a competitive
bidding model where the expected rent increases with the number of bidders. The results
from the contract-based bribe measure, therefore, suggest that firms with high market power
might (less bidders) likely already have established networks and are less likely to engage in
bribes to get things done.
Next, I look at the firm-level characteristics in each model where several features are
worth noting. Age enters the equation positively which supports the hypothesis that older
firms, compared to younger firms, are more likely to bribe. Capital is positive and significant
suggesting firm’s operating in the capital city are more likely to bribe. The positive sign
may be due to most government offices also being located in capital cities. Likewise, the
firm’s export status (=1 if exporter) enters the equation positively implying exporters are
more likely to engage in bribes. Ownership variables are negative and significant. Compared
to firms with private firm owners, foreign and government owners are less likely to bribe.
These results as consistent with previous literature in which stronger (weaker) market
competition is associated with higher (lower) bribes. However, it should be noted that the
markup results are different from the previous two studies. In this paper, markup is calcu-
lated as the ratio of output elasticity of intermediate inputs to the revenue share of interme-
diate inputs. Both previous papers are unable to find a statistically significant relationship
between markup and bribes, although the signs are correct. Thus, the results suggest that
the relationship between competition at the firm-level is economically meaningful and highly
robust to various firm-level controls on corruption.
Finally, I provide a series of checks by replacing markup with other competition measures
to see if the results continue to hold. The first measure is an indicator on whether the firm
faces informal competition in the market. The WBES specifically asks “Does the firm face
informal competition against informal or unregistered firms?” Based on responses to this
question, a binary variable (informal comp) is created where responses “yes” are coded as one
and zero otherwise. The level of competition a firm faces, based on whether there is informal
competition in the market, is difficult to interpret as the exact number of competitors are
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unknown. However, as La Porta and Shleifer (2014) show that informal firms can account to
about 50 % of economic activity in developing countries, including this measure is important.
The second measure is the logarithm of one plus the number of competitors reported by the
firm (Num Comp). This is different from the interval range listed below because it asks the
firm to provide a value for the exact number of competitors. This measure, however, has its
concerns. A large firm potentially could have several small size firms as competitors which
might not impact a large firm’s operation. On the other hand, a large firm could potentially
have several large size firms as competitors which might have a big impact on a large firm’s
operation. In addition, the sample size is relatively small (about 7,000 observations) for
this measure and including country, industry, and year fixed effects could lead to a loss
of degrees of freedom. The third measure is range of number of competitors that denotes
the intensity for competition. More specifically, the survey question asks “for the main
market in which this establishment sold its main product, how many competitors did this
establishment’s main product/product line face?” The survey only provides four categories
for a response and the data is coded as follows: no competition (coded 0, used as the
benchmark); competitor=1 (coded 1); competitors between 2-5 (coded 2); Competitors >5
(coded 3).
Table 1.9 reports the results of estimating a series of different measures of competition
on corruption with the tobit model 1.12. Overall, the estimated result confirms that greater
market competition increases the incidence to bribes. The dependent variable in columns 1-3
is the sales-based bribe measure and the dependent variable in columns 4-6 is the contract-
based bribe measure. In column 1, the number of competitors is insignificant but has the
correct sign. This could be due to less observations and the loss of degrees of freedom due to
inclusion of fixed effects. Column 2 indicates that firms facing no informal competitors are
less likely to bribe. The sales-based bribe measure increases by 0.44 units for firms facing
informal competition, which is statistically significance at the 1% level. For the interval of
competitors, firms facing one competitor (compared to none) are less likely to bribe. In
other words, firms facing competition (with one firm) decreases the incidence of bribes for
sales-based bribe measure by 0.276 units. This relationship is statistically significant at
the 10% level. Similarly, firms that face competition with more than 5 firms (compared to
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none), the incidence to bribes, measured by the sales-based bribe indicator, increases by
0.245 units. This result is statistically significant at the 5% level. For the contract-based
measure in column 4, the coefficient on the number of competitors is significant at the 1 %
level. In column 5, the coefficient of informal competition is positive and significant at the
1% level. The results indicate that there is about a 0.94 units increase in contract-based
bribe measure for firms facing informal competition. The last column includes the intervals
of number of competitors. Firms facing 5 or more competitors are more likely to engage in
bribes as measured by the contract-based bribe measure.
Two points are noteworthy. First, the results presented in this paper are consistent with
previous research that have utilized firm-level data to analyze the competition-corruption
link. Despite differences in our data sample and measurement of market competition, this
paper arrives at the same conclusion that higher (lower) market competition levels increases
(decreases) the incidence to bribe. Second, the results are consistent across alternative
measures of market competition when firm-level controls are employed in the models.
1.6 Conclusion and Limitations
This paper revisits the link between market competition and corruption using the WBES
data for 95 developing countries from 2006-2016. For my analysis, I examine market compe-
tition as firm-level markup which is calculated as the ratio of output elasticity of intermediate
inputs to expenditure share of intermediate inputs. Previous empirical research at the firm-
level have calculated markup as the profit-sales ratio; however, this method might not be
accurate because the firms are less likely to maximize profits and more likely to hire excess
labor in developing countries. In addition, these studies do not find a statistically signif-
icant relationship between markup and corruption. This paper, therefore, contributes to
the literature by finding a statistically significant negative correlation between markup and
corruption. This result is consistent across other measures of competition including number
of competitors and informal competition. Thus, I conclude that firm-level competition does
indeed matter in determining the levels of corruption.
The markup estimated in this paper does have limitations. One can argue that the
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endogeneity associated in production function estimation is ignored. However, given the
lack of dynamic panel data, the best alternative method to generate the input coefficients
is with the inclusion of country, industry, and year fixed-effects. Another downside is the
significant reduction in observations due to focus on the manufacturing sector. The future
version of the paper will explore the service sector and find an appropriate instrument to
test the exogenous variation in markup.
My findings have implications for designing policies related to fair competition in de-
veloping countries. It should be noted that this paper does not recommend a decrease in
market competition to decrease the level of corruption. But, it is of importance to figure
out the extent to which a firm has market power and if there are any costs associated with
the high market power. If the costs associated with the monopoly power are greater than
the costs associated bribery, then it might be important to look deeper at any policies that
lead to fairer competition. In addition, it is important to explore the extent to which firms
cluster together for the positive relationship between competition and corruption to hold.
Do the competitors have to be located in the same city or region? How much of monopoly
power does the firm possess in a specific city or region? I hope to address these questions in
future works.
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics for main variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
bribe sales* 0.25 0.66 0 4.615 26928
bribe contract* 0.596 1.049 0 4.615 8339
sales dummy 0.194 0.395 0 1 26929
contract dummy 0.199 0.399 0 1 11702
markup* 0.393 0.624 -0.387 2.892 36301
Competitors* 1.996 1.232 0 9.210 9916
Interval Comp 3.464 0.807 1 4 24862
age* 2.683 0.813 0 5.088 53675
exporter 0.261 0.439 0 1 54370
capital 0.511 0.5 0 1 44126
prishare 90.028 27.725 0 100 53646
forshare 7.698 24.756 0 100 53592
govshare 0.721 6.708 0 100 53613
Notes: * denotes the variable is entered in log form. bribe sales
is the log of one plus bribe measured as the percentage of total
sales. bribe contract is the log of one plus bribe measured as per-
centage of contract value. Markup is the log of ratio of the output
elasticity from the production function to share of expenditure
of on intermediate inputs. Competitors is logarithm of one plus
the number of competitors reported by the firm. Interval comp is
the intervals for number of competitors (0; Competitor=1; Com-
petitors between 2-5; Competitors >5). Age is the log difference
between the survey year and and the year in which the establish-
ment started its operation. Exporter is a dummy variable where
if indirect exports - sold domestically to third party that exports
products- and direct exports > 5% is coded as one and zero oth-
erwise. Capital is a dummy that takes on 1 if the firm is located
in the capital city, 0 otherwise. For ownership, prishare, forshare,
govshare represent the percentage of ownership by private, foreign,
government parties.
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics for Production Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
ln real R 17.32 3.127 7.576 30.405
ln N 15.326 2.992 2.708 25.767
ln real K 15.68 3.245 0.694 27.455
ln real M 16.42 3.194 4.249 27.745
Notes: All variables represent log transformation.
R is total sales of the firm, K is the net book value,
N is the wage bill, M is intermediate inputs. All
values are in 2005 U.S. dollars.
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Table 1.3: Production Function Estimates By Industry with Fixed Effects
Industry ln N s.e. ln real K s.e. ln real M s.e. Constant s.e. Observations
Food and Beverages 0.313*** (0.010) 0.072*** (0.008) 0.615*** (0.011) 1.089*** (0.038) 7,316
Textiles, Leathers, and Garments 0.347*** (0.010) 0.063*** (0.006) 0.590*** (0.009) 1.190*** (0.070) 7,887
Wood and Furniture 0.295*** (0.034) 0.072*** (0.017) 0.633*** (0.031) 1.364*** (0.523) 1,201
Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 0.333*** (0.014) 0.063*** (0.010) 0.604*** (0.015) 1.497*** (0.016) 3,270
Non-metallic and Plastic materials 0.312*** (0.016) 0.066*** (0.009) 0.622*** (0.016) 1.009*** (0.065) 4,016
Metals and Machinery 0.292*** (0.012) 0.060*** (0.007) 0.649*** (0.012) 4.986*** (1.819) 5,763
Electronics 0.309*** (0.025) 0.044*** (0.014) 0.647*** (0.023) 1.433*** (0.240) 1,140
Auto and Auto Industry 0.352*** (0.033) 0.055*** (0.016) 0.593*** (0.034) 0.775*** (0.015) 662
Other Manufacturing 0.311*** (0.014) 0.038*** (0.007) 0.651*** (0.014) 1.142*** (0.037) 4,092
Retail and Whole Sale Trade 0.423*** (0.058) -0.039 (0.038) 0.616*** (0.050) 2.218*** (0.089) 298
Notes: OLS regression for each industry is run separately with country and year fixed-effects. All variables represent log transformation
ln(x+ 1).
R is total sales of the firm, K is the net book value, N is the wage bill, M is intermediate inputs. All values are in 2005 U.S. dollars..
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.4: Production Function Estimates with Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES CD CRS-CD Translog Kmenta
ln N 0.313*** 0.318*** 0.316*** 0.332***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005)
ln real K 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.079*** 0.055***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003)
ln real M 0.620*** 0.621*** 0.614*** 0.614***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
ln N sq 0.019*** 0.017***
(0.002) (0.001)
ln K sq 0.016*** 0.017***
(0.001) (0.001)
ln N K -0.036*** -0.035***
(0.003) (0.003)
Constant 1.250*** 1.220*** 1.168*** 1.183***
(0.058) (0.057) (0.065) (0.056)
Observations 33,313 33,313 33,313 33,313
R-squared 0.940 0.941
ES 3.939
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: OLS regression for each specification includes year and
country fixed effects. Results are similar when industry fixed
effects are used. All variables represent log transformation
ln(x+ 1). R is total sales of the firm, K is the net book value,
N is the wage bill, M is intermediate inputs. All values are
in 2005 U.S. dollars.. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.5: Level Markups by Sector
industry n median mean
Food & Beverages 1.235 1.993
Textiles , Leather , Garments 1.338 2.122
Wood and furniture 1.389 2.083
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 1.228 2.086
Non-metallic and plastic materials 1.217 1.996
Metals and Machinery 1.248 2.017
Electronics 1.255 2.150
Auto and auto components 0.975 1.648
Other manufacturing 1.373 1.992
Retail 1.117 2.070
Total 1.273 2.034
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Table 1.6: OLS regression: markup and
the number of competitors
(1) (2)
VARIABLES markup markup
1 Competitor 0.012
(0.036)
2-5 Competitors -0.089***
(0.023)
> 5 Competitors -0.093***
(0.022)
Num comp -0.006
(0.007)
Observations 15,861 5,167
R-squared 0.058 0.188
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The dependent variable is the nat-
ural logarithm of markup which is calcu-
lated as the ratio of the output elastic-
ity from the production function to share
of expenditure of on intermediate inputs.
Column (2) measures the interval for num-
ber of competitors and coded as (no com-
petitors= 0; Competitor=1; Competitors
between 2-5; Competitors >5. In column
(2)) Num comp measures the natural log-
arithm of one plus number of competitors
reported by the firm. Both columns in-
clude country and year fixed effects.
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Table 1.7: Probit, Logit and OLS regression for markup and bribes
Dep Var: sales-based bribe contract-based bribe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Probit Logit OLS Probit Logit OLS
ln markup -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009** -0.013*** -0.013** -0.017**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
ln age 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.024 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004) (0.059) (0.005)
exporter 0.008 0.010 0.009 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005
(0.013) (0.014) (0.007) (0.017) (0.018) (0.011)
capital 0.039 0.032 0.013 0.04 0.04 0.019
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.12) (0.016)
forshare -0.049*** -0.045*** -0.027*** -0.006 -0.006 -0.005
(0.025) (0.082) (0.023) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016)
govshare -0.090*** -0.076*** -0.038* -0.059 -0.61 -0.027
(0.02) (0.199) (0.024) (0.045) (0.044) (0.047)
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 22,284 22,284 22,486 3,722 3,722 3,722
R-squared 0.113 0.172
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Column 1 & 4 report estimated marginal effects from the probit model. Column
2 & 5 report values from the logit. Column 3 & 6 report values from linear probability
model. All columns report robust standard errors clustered at the country-sector level
in brackets. In column 1-3, the dependent variable is a binary variable that indicates
whether firm has paid bribe, measured as a percentage of total sales. In column 4-6,
the dependent variable is a binary variable that indicates whether firm has paid bribe,
measured as a percentage of government contract. All columns control for firm-level
characters: age, export, capital, ownership.
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Table 1.8: Tobit model for markup and bribes
Dep Var: sale-based bribe contract-based bribe
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln markup -0.034 -0.056* -0.046*** -0.096***
(0.027) (0.033) (0.009) (0.013)
ln age 0.022*** -0.128***
(0.06) (0.012)
exporter 0.057 -0.213***
(0.062) (0.034)
capital 0.118* 0.093***
(0.068) (0.035)
forshare -0.300*** -0.105***
(0.087) (0.030)
govshare -0.419* -0.120**
(0.215) (0.053)
Observations 29,518 22,485 9,307 3,722
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Reported values are estimated from the tobit model
with country, industry, and year fixed effects. Clustered stan-
dard errors at the country-sector level in brackets. The depen-
dent variable in column (1) & (2) is bribe measured as percent-
age of total sales. The dependent variable in column (3) & (4)
is bribe measured as percentage of contract value. Column (2)
& (4) include firm-level controls, such as, age, export, capital,
ownership.
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Table 1.9: Tobit model for competition and corruption (graft sales)
Dep Var: sale-based bribe contract-based bribe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5)
VARIABLES bribe sales bribe sales bribe sales sales contract sales contract sales contract
Num comp 0.072 0.194***
(0.067) (0.024)
Informal Comp 0.444*** 0.944***
(0.061) (0.029)
1 Competitor -0.276* -0.213
(0.149) (0.189)
2-5 Competitors 0.057 -0.151
(0.110) (0.189)
> 5 Competitors 0.245** 0.352*
(0.124) (0.183)
ln age 0.089 0.043 -0.074** 0.093*** -0.135*** -0.140***
(0.066) (0.032) (0.033) (0.023) (0.012) (0.051)
exporter 0.199 0.103 0.083 0.695*** -0.083** -0.069
(0.137) (0.067) (0.074) (0.067) (0.033) (0.105)
capital -0.148 0.076 0.269** 0.249*** 0.045 0.226
(0.108) (0.069) (0.107) (0.055) (0.032) (0.221)
prishare -0.071 -0.250*** -0.397*** -1.334*** 0.041 -0.168
(0.257) (0.095) (0.094) (0.047) (0.029) (0.129)
govshare -0.068 -0.189 -0.270 -2.929*** -0.869*** -0.574
(0.483) (0.217) (0.252) (0.096) (0.043) (0.487)
Observations 7,794 30,792 15,422 1,692 5,375 8,310
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Reported values are estimated from the Tobit model with country, industry, and year fixed effects.
Clustered standard errors at the country-sector level in brackets. The dependent variable in column 1-3 is
bribe as a percentage of total sales. The dependent variable in column 4-6 is bribe as percentage of contract
value. All columns include age, export, capital, ownership as firm-level control.
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Chapter 2
Competition, Corruption, and
Nonresponses at the Firm-level
2.1 Introduction
In this paper I investigate the relationship between firm-level competition, business con-
straints, managerial traits, and missing corruption observations using the World Bank En-
terprise Survey (henceforth, WBES). The paper focuses on three important questions: Do
high-markup firms have more contact with public officials for a service? Are high-markup
firms more likely to make a payment for bribes? For high-markup firms, what are the
response rates on the payment question? The motivation for these questions can be sum-
marized as follows. First, despite the unanimity about the effects of market competition on
corruption at the firm-level, the effects of the nonresponse to the corruption-related ques-
tions has not been measured in this literature. The general model that links competition
to corruption hinges on truthful responses to corruption-related questions that are close to
actual estimates. This implies that to understand corruption, it is important to first look at
firm-level characteristics that determine the exposure, incidence, and nonresponses to cor-
ruption (bribery). Yet, most studies that have utilized firm-level data consider the amount
stated by the respondent accurate, and ignore the implications of nonresponses and false
responses in the data.
Second, Mendez and Sepulveda (2010) theoretically show corruption equilibria differs
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in regards to behavior and incentives; therefore, different measures of corruption can lead
to very different estimates. Before availability of firm-level data, early research focused on
country-level indicators based on expert opinions. More recently, studies have used firm-level
data that measures the firms’ experience in dealing with corruption; however, researchers
still continue to differ in what defines corruption.1 For instance, Svensson (2003) use data on
incidences (frequency) to bribes, while Clarke and Xu (2004), Alexeev and Song (2013) uses
data on amounts paid by private firms (or percentage of total sales). Similarly, Olken (2007)
use differences in total reported expenditures and total expenses expenditures in Indonesia.
Therefore, by providing a comprehensive sequence of events to derive the results, I attempt
to find consistency in firm-level data. I focus on looking at different situations in which a
firm has to have contact with a public official i.e. to apply for government contracts and
licenses.
The main results of the paper can be summarized as follows. My research first matches
the exposure to bribery to informal payments to show that high-markup firms are more
likely to be self-selected, which creates a biased sample population. The paper identifies
four different categories of corruption2 which includes: dealing with tax officials, securing a
government contract, obtaining import licenses, and obtaining operating licenses. Second,
the paper determines the probability of a firm being requested (or expected) to pay at
each of these contacts. The results show that there is a systematic self-selection in the data
generation process. High-markup firms, operating in less competitive environments, are more
likely to have contact with public officials, but less likely to actually make a payment. It is
important to note that I do not address the nonresponses in the initial phase of questions.
Respondents that state “no” on whether a service was applied are assumed to have paid
no bribes. My research then matches the nonresponses to the corruption-related question
1See Bardhan (2006) for a similar description.
2This paper uses government officials, public officials, and higher authority interchangeably. Likewise,
there is a distinction between payments made and whether a firm came in contact with a public official. If
the firm applied for a service or is visited by a tax official, I collective term this as exposure (contact) with
the public official. Similarly, the paper also defines expected payments or payments made to a public official
for a service as corruption. The answer to this question depends on how one chooses to measure corruption.
For instance, to secure a government contract, the question is framed as: “what percentage of the contract
value is paid in bribes?”, while to obtain an import license, the question is framed as: “was the firm expected
to make a payment?”. In both cases, I consider a payment made if the firm stated a positive value in the
former and an affirmative response in the later.
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at each incidence to show that the high-markup firms are more likely to not respond to
the question on payments. These results, therefore, imply that the negative correlation
between weaker competition and corruption, generated in the second phase and by other
research papers, might not be representative. It also suggests that competition (determined
by markups) is important to determine the response rate to corruption-related questions.
This paper makes two important contributions to the literature. To my knowledge, this
paper is the first to exploit different firm-level controls to assess whether the competition-
corruption relationship continues to hold at each sequences (i.e. exposure, incidence, and
nonresponses). Moreover, understanding which firm-level controls influence nonresponses on
corruption-related questions is crucial in order to accurately evaluate the impact of markup.
While the amount of nonresponses has been considered a problem in several cross-national
studies, little research has focused on the data generation process and solutions to address the
systematic self-selection to the corruption related questions.3 Second, the research highlights
the importance of sample selection bias on the measure of competition and reveals that
high-up firms and government-owned enterprises determine the likelihood of responses to
corruption-related questions.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses previous firm-level literature
between competition and corruption, and highlighting the importance of nonresponses to
corruption-related questions. Section 3 provides data and summary statistics. Section 4
provides three different empirical series and section5 provides a brief conclusion.
2.2 Literature Review
Before exploring the literature on incidences to bribes, the paper highlights research that
considers market competition as an approach to dealing corruption.4 This paper, therefore,
complements the more recent empirical development in this literature that relies on firm-level
survey data. My research shows only two other published papers on this topic by Alexeev
3For instance, see Jensen et al. (2010) and Berinsky and Tucker (2006)
4Please refer to chapter 1 for a complete discussion on the theoretical side of the competition-corruption.
In addition, the focus in this chapter is more on research that have utilized firm-level data. A detailed
literature review on papers that have utilized country-level data has been carefully crafted in Chapter 1.
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and Song (2013) and Diaby and Sylwester (2015); both papers find a positive association
between market competition and the amount of bribes paid. However, it is important to note
that the aforementioned papers find no statistical significant relationship between firm-level
markup and corruption. In addition, both papers drop the missing bribe observations which
can create a systematic bias in the data. For instance, Alexeev and Song (2013) consider
missing observations ‘white noise’ and exclude them from the sample. This is noteworthy
since ignoring almost half of the sample to make inference on the competition-corruption
relation could result in incorrect inferences. If firms that face competition are self-selected
by different government officials, the estimated results on corruption might not be accurate
due to biased sample.
The focus of this paper is, therefore, to determine the response rates to corruption-
related questions. Despite all of the work on the causes and consequences of corruption,5
there has been little work on the nonresponses to corruption-related questions, especially at
the firm-level. Among other things, the amount of nonresponses has been attributed to the
national political environment in a country where the firm operates. Using data from the
WBES, Jensen et al. (2010) show that both at the national and firm-levels, countries with
lower levels of political freedom are more likely to not answer bribe-related question and are
more likely to provide a false response. Similarly, the authors find firms report corruption
as being less severe than those reported by the Kaufmann et al. (2007) corruption index.
Another paper by Svensson (2003) addresses the issue of nonresponses when estimating
the incidences (or exposure) to bribes. Using the Ugandan enterprise survey, they find
considerable variation in reported graft across firms. They, however, find no differences in
the firm-level characteristic for the firms that refused to respond and firms that respond to
corruption-related question.6 A closely related paper by Rand and Tarp (2012) also looks
5See Dimant and Tosato (2017) for detailed survey of the corruption literature. With the availability
of different datasets, there has been a large increase in the literature on the causes and consequences of
corruption. For instance, more earlier studies on the causes and consequences were conducted by Rose-
Ackerman (1978), Shleifer and Vishny (1993), and Bardhan (1997). More recent studies look at the effect
of corruption by focusing on foreign direct investments and economic growth in the long-run. For instance,
see Wei (2000), Svensson (2005), Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995).
6Svensson (2003) use a dummy variable (=1) for missing bribe responses as the dependent variable
and firm size, profit, capital stock, and capital as the main independent variables. More specifically, they
estimate whether the coefficients from this regression are different from a model where the dependent variable
is whether firm reported a positive bribe (=1).
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at the incidence to bribe in Vietnam and find that the mechanisms for the incidences and
amount of bribes paid vary significantly. They also find that bribes is significantly correlated
when dealing with government official with regards to a contract; however, this result does
not hold when dealing with custom officials. Therefore, my study aims to take this empirical
strategy one-step further by also generating probabilities on refusal to answer key corruption-
related question.
2.3 Data
The data used for this study comes from the Enterprise Surveys of the World Bank
(WBES). The data includes 141 countries and covers 14 main manufacturing industries from
2006 to 2016.7 The manufacturing industries have been classified according to the major 2
digit ISIC code.8
2.3.1 Corruption Variables
The paper identifies four different categories of corruption which includes exposure or
payments to different situations: dealing with tax officials, securing a government contract,
obtaining import licenses, and obtaining operating licenses. For each of these four situations,
three sequences of estimation are performed. First, to determine the probability of being self-
selected, I look at responses to the question on whether the firm has exposure (or contact) to
a public official in the aforementioned scenarios. For example, I look at whether high-markup
firms are more likely to apply for an import license or be visited by a tax official. Table 2.1
summarizes the key corruption variables used in the analysis. 59.42% of firms reported being
visited by a tax official in the previous 12 months. Similarly, 17.58% of firms attempted to
secure a government contract in the previous 12 months. Likewise, 12.62% (24.44%) of firms
applied for an importing license (operating license) in the past 12 months.
Second, to determine the probability of whether an informal payment or gift is made or
7Sample updated September 2016. Refer to table 2.10 for a list of countries in the sample.
8In particular, the industries are: food and beverages; textiles; leathers; garments; products, leather, and
footwear; wood and furniture; chemicals and pharmaceuticals; non-metallic and plastics; metals, machinery
and equipment; electronics; auto and auto components; retail; and other manufacturing.
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expected, responses conditional on exposure, are analyzed. For example, given the responses
provided in the first question, I look at whether high-markup firms are more likely to make
a payment. 14.57% of firms reported that a gift or informal payment was expected or
requested when visited by a tax official. Similarly, 20.0% of firms reported paying bribes
to secure a government contract. Likewise, 13.20% (16.14%) of firms reported that a gift
or informal payment was expected or requested when applying for an importing license
(operating license).
Finally, to determine the probability of a firm’s nonresponse to payments, I look at
missing observations in regards to the payment question contingent on the firm having a
contact (exposure) with a public official. More specifically, this research intends to evaluate
survey responses “do not know” and “refuse to answer” given the firm was in contact with
public officials. 5.2% of firms refused to answer whether a gift or informal payment was
expected or requested when visited by a tax official. Similarly, 85.4% of firms refused to
answer whether bribes were paid to secure a government contract. Likewise, 6.1% (5.2%) of
firms refused to answer on whether a gift or informal payment was expected or requested
when applying for an importing license (operating license).
2.3.2 Markup
The main interest is to figure out whether the high-markup firms are self-selected in the
data generation process. Therefore, the main independent variable is the level of competition
or markups. The solution recently suggested by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) is to
include an assumption that firms are cost-minimizers and choose at least one freely adjustable
input. They calculate markup as the ratio of output elasticity of an input(s) to the total
expenditure share of the input(s) and relate these to firm level export status. An advantage to
this approach is that it is relatively easy to estimate firm specific markup without requiring
any information on the market structure and the firm’s input demand (De Loecker and
Warzynski, 2012). I, therefore, follow this simple intuitive idea that relies the price=marginal
cost condition for firms with a perfectly elastic demand curve. Consequently, at this point
the total labor expenditure is equal to the total revenue (or total sales) and any difference
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between the two constitutes the markup.
To calculate markups, first I estimate the labor expenditure share using data on labor
costs and total revenue. The WBES defines labor costs as the total annual wages and
all annual benefits, including food, transport, and social security (i.e. pensions, medical
insurance, and unemployment insurance) and total sales as the value of all annual sales,
including manufactured goods and goods the establishment buys for trading. Second, I
regress country, sector, and ownership fixed-effects on labor expenditure share to retrieve
country and sector specific coefficients. After that, the linear predicted values on the labor
expenditure share are estimated. For simplicity, the predicted values for each firm i in
industry j located in country c will be the same i.e. the predicted values will differ by
each country and each industry. The final step is to calculate the differences between the
(observed) labor expenditure share and the predicted values. If the firm is operating in a
perfectly competitive setting, the difference between the two values should be zero. Likewise,
if the firm is operating in an imperfect setting, the difference between the two values will be
the markups.
Table 2.2 provides the summary statistics for markups by sector averages. Before es-
timating these results, I have eliminated questionable outliers; therefore, firms with large
absolute values after the log transformations on markups that result in zero, negative, or
missing values are eliminated from the sample. This includes trimming the the top and
bottom 1% from the sample. The mean of markup is 2.02 with a standard deviation of
4.5. There is considerable differences for markups across industries. The three sectors with
higher markups are leather (2.25), retail (2.29), and electronics (2.11). Conversely, the three
sectors with lowest markups (at the level) are the auto and its components (1.73), garments
and textiles (1.78 and 1.84, respectively), and metals and machinery (1.87). Similarly, in
table 2.5 , I look at different firm-level traits and markups. Firms that export have a high-
markup (2.24) compared to non-exporters (1.96). This result is consistent with De Loecker
and Warzynski (2012) who find that exporters have higher markups due to the productiv-
ity premiums. Firms with male owners have a higher markup (2.03) compared to female
owners (1.98); however, the difference is minimal. Similarly, firms with a quality-controlled
certificate have higher markups implying that there is some degree of power associated with
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obtaining a certificate approval. Foreign and government firms also have higher markups.
Before presenting the main empirical results, I first look at firm-level characteristics that
determine markup. Table 2.5 shows the results for the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) re-
gressions where the dependent variable is log of markup. The main independent variables
include the firm’s export and ownership status, age, certificate on quality, and the respon-
dents opinion on whether access to finance and transportation are an obstacle to the current
operation and growth of the firm. Columns 2, 3, and 4 controls, respectively, for sector,
country, and time fixed-effects, while column 5 includes all three fixed-effects. Standards
errors are clustered at country-sector-year levels in all columns.
The results can be summarized as follows. There is a positive and statistically significant
correlation between firms that export, compared to non-exporters, and markups implying
that firms that export have some degree of monopoly power. Similarly, the coefficient on cer-
tificate is also positively correlated with markup implying that the internationally-recognized
certificate allows firm to have higher markups. More established firms are also likely to ex-
hibit some degree of market power. These results are statistically significant at the 1% level
and are robust to the introduction of different fixed-effects. Similarly, there is a positive
correlation between the respondent that considers transportation an obstacle to the current
operation and markups implying that the high-markup firms are geographically protected.
On the contrary, there is a negative correlation between the respondent that considers access
to finance an obstacle to the current operation and markups implying that readily available
finance can facilitate competition, thereby reducing monopoly power of a firm.
2.3.3 Firm-level determinants to bribery
Following previous firm-level studies, I control for firm-level characteristics that can in-
fluence the relationship between competition and the incidences, payments, and amount of
nonresponses to corruption. Batra et al. (2003) find that private firms are more likely to
bribe, pay a higher revenue share as bribes, and more likely to consider bribe as an obstacle.
Similarly, firms with large private, foreign, or government shares could face different bribe
environments in dealing with public officials. Hence, I include a dummy variable equal to
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one for firms with more than 50% of ownership by private foreign individuals, companies,
or organizations (forshare), and two for more than 50% ownership by government or state
(govshare), while considering the percentage of shares owned by the private domestic in-
dividuals, companies, or organizations as a benchmark. I also include a variable on export
status, which is a dummy variable representing a value one if the sum of the indirect exports9
and direct exports (denoted as a percentage of the establishment’s sales) is greater than 5%,
zero otherwise (i.e., national sales is coded zero). Studies have shown that firms that ex-
port internationally, as compared to domestic sales, might be more prone to government
rent extraction and therefore, are more likely to bribe to continue operation. Certificate is
a dummy variable where one represents the firm has an internationally-recognized quality
certification, 0 otherwise. Approximately 11.03% of the firms have some degree of foreign
share and 2% of firms have some degree of government share.10 About 27% of firms have the
internationally recognized quality certificate and 20% of the firms are exporters. Summary
statistics reported in table 2.4 and table 2.5.
Age is calculated as the logarithmic difference between the survey year and and the year
in which the establishment started its operation. The suggested direction of age is mixed
in the literature. It is possible that old firms are more established and have networks with
government officials and, therefore, need to bribe less to remain in the market. On the other
hand, young firms may be more likely to bribe if the market is competitive. The same may be
expected for the manager’s experience level as a relatively more experienced manager might
be able to report the requested bribes to a higher authority because of established networks.
Gender of the owner can also determine the response rate and incidence to bribes since males
and females could have different response behavior in each scenario. These latter two set of
controls are linked to the managerial traits of the firm that can influence corruption. The
mean level of manager’s experience is 16.3 years with a standard deviation of 11.3 years.
Likewise, the average age of the firm is 17.5 years with a standard deviation of 14.56 years.
Similarly, 29% of the firms have a female owner.
Other barriers to the firms current operations are also considered: crimes, theft, disorder;
9Indirect exports include the percentage of sales sold domestically to third party that exports products.
10For this estimation, I look at foreign and government ownership greater than 1 %.
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electricity; transportation of goods, supplies, and inputs; access to financing; and tax rates.
For each obstacle, a binary variable is create that takes on a value of zero if the respondent
states “no”, “minor”, and “moderate” on whether the aforementioned business constraints
affect current operation of the firm. Responses “major” and “very severe” are coded as one.
These questions are tied to the perception of the respondent; however, including them in
the model reveals how business constraints can affect the corruption incidences and amount
of nonresponses in the data. About 19%, 35%, and 8% of the respondents consider crime,
power, and the interpretation of rules by public officials an obstacle to current operation.
All variables and descriptions are carefully outlined in 2.9.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
The goal of the paper is to employ a sequence of estimations to determine whether the
high-markup firms are indeed more likely to not respond to the corruption-related questions.
Therefore, I carefully outline each sequence in the following sections.
2.4.1 Do high-markup firms have more exposure to public offi-
cials?
The empirical approach first consists of estimating an establishment’s probability of being
self-selected in four different scenarios: visit by a tax official, attempt to secure a government
contract, submit an application for an import license, and operating license. The objective is
to the test whether high-markup firms are more likely to be in a situation where extraction
of bribes is possible. More specifically, the following probit model is estimated:
P (exposureit = 1) = Φ(β1markupit + β2Xit + β3obstaclesit + δc + δt + δj + it > 0) (2.1)
The dependent variable is a binary that takes on a value of one if the respondent answers
yes to the question on whether the firm applied for a services (government contract, import,
operating licenses) or was visited by a tax official, and zero if the respondent answers no.
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The subscript notation is described as follows: a firm i is located in country c at a given
time t. Note that the empirical analysis only focuses on situations where the firm comes in
contact with a public official with the assumption that firms that do not come in contact are
not likely to make bribe payments.
All specifications include firm-level controls (Xit), business obstacles (obstaclesit), and
country, industry, and year fixed effects (denoted as δc, δj, and δt respectively). Since the
sample includes 141 different countries from four continents, the inclusion of country fixed
effects controls for countrywide factors: country’s legal system, legal origin, rule of law, and
regulation of various economic activities that could influence corruption (Treisman (2000a)).
The inclusion of industry fixed effects is to control for the exogenous variation in different
industries that can influence the relationship between markups and bribe payments. In the
same vein, the inclusion of time fixed effects is to capture any macroeconomic trend or policies
of a country that could potentially influence the firm’s intention to apply for a services (or
be visited). All estimations use robust standard errors clustered at the country-sector-year
level to allow errors to be correlated within the same country, industry, and year. Column 1
(2) regresses markup on exposure to visit from tax officials (with fixed-effects), column 3 (4)
regresses markup on government procurement (with fixed-effects), column 5 (6) and 7 (8)
regresses markup on applying for import license (with fixed-effects) and operating license
(with fixed-effects), respectively.
The coefficients from estimating the probit model are presented in table 2.6. The effect of
markups on exposure to bribery is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in all
columns. For interpretation, the marginal effect of markup in column 2 is 0.01 (not reported)
implying that an infinitesimal increase in markup enhances the probability of being visited
by tax official by 0.1 percentage point. In all cases, high-markup firms are self-selected
and are more likely to be in contact with public officials that could potentially increase the
probability of bribing. Therefore, in this set-up, firms that do not meet with public officials
do not bribe, compared to firms that frequently need to visit different public officials.
Several firm-level features are worth noting. The firm’s foreign ownership status is posi-
tively correlated with each exposure to bribery. The probability of a visit by a tax official,
securing a government contract (not significant), applying for an operating license, and ap-
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plying for an import license increases with foreign ownership. The latter two cases are likely
associated to the operating regulations of each country that the foreign firm needs to apply
to start or remain in business. Similarly, it could be that foreign firms have less networks
(or association) in the host country of business, which increases the probability of exposure
to different public officials.11
Other surprising results are that the probability of submitting an import and operating
license, and securing a government contract increases with having a female owner (compared
to male owner.) Similarly, for attempts to secure a government contract and import license,
the probability of exposure to bribery decreases with an increase in the manager’s level of
experience. This supports the hypothesis that experienced managers already have established
networks and are less likely to be exposed to public officials. The results for firm’s age is
mixed. Excluding the application for operating licenses, an increase in the firm’s age enhances
the probability of being exposed to bribery.
Next, I look at different business constraints that determine the exposure to bribes.
Firms that consider crime, electricity, interpretation of the rules and laws, and tax rates as a
major and severe obstacle to its current operation are also likely to enhance the probability of
being in contact with different public officials. Overall, the results strongly suggest that high-
markup firms are likely to be self-selected by public officials in all four categories. This result
also holds models with fixed-effects. Having contact with public officials, therefore, could
increase bribe extraction for the high-markup firms. As a consequence, the next empirical
strategy is to test whether high-markup firms made a bribe payment at the aforementioned
scenarios.
11This result is consistent with Chatterjee and Ray (2012) who show that there is a positive association
between exports and foreign ownership and bribe demands.
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2.4.2 Are high-markup firms more likely to pay bribes?
The second empirical strategy is to estimate the probability of an informal payment12
made given that an exposure was made. The goal is to compare this outcome to the prob-
ability of no extortions (no requests/expectation) conditional on the probability of being
exposed (or having an incidence to bribery). As mentioned earlier, firms that do not have
contact with public officials do not bribe i.e. to bribe, the firm has to be in one of situation
where bribe extraction is possible. To look at this, the following probit model is estimated:
P (payit = 1|expoit = 1) = Φ(β1muit + β2Xit + β3obstit + δc + δt + δj + it > 0) (2.2)
The dependent variable is a binary that takes on a value of one if the respondent answers yes
to the question on whether a gift or informal payment was requested or made, and zero if
the respondent answers no. All other firm-level controls and business obstacles remain same
as equation 2.1.
Table 2.7 shows the results for the probit model with clustered standard errors at the
country, industry, and year level. In all columns, the coefficient on markups is insignificant
and negative. Thus, while the probability of being exposed increases for high-markup firms,
at each event, the probability of an informal payment decreases. These results are not
surprising as stronger (weaker) market competition has been associated with greater (less)
corruption in more recent firm-level studies;13 however, both studies do not show that the
probability of payment decreases and this is contingent on high-markup firms being self-
selected in the first place.
Next I look at managerial skills and traits that determine the informal payments. The
probability of having a payment requested decreases with the manager’s experience level.
This could be due to the manager’s established networks or ability to report the bribes
12Note that informal payments, expected payments, and payments made all refer to the same issue that
bribery occurred. The difference in the response lies in the way the question is posed and on how one chooses
to measure corruption. For instance, to secure a government contract, the question asks:“ what percentage
of the contract value is paid in bribes?”, while to obtain an import license, the question asks:“ was the firm
expected to make a payment?”. In both cases, I consider a payment made if the firm stated a positive value
in the former and an affirmative response in the latter.
13For instance, see Alexeev and Song (2013) and Diaby and Sylwester (2015).
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demanded to a higher authority. Also related to managerial skills, the coefficient on female is
mostly negative implying that, compared to male counterparts, female owners are less likely
to be requested an informal payment or gift. As Swamy et al. (2001) and Mocan (2008)
explain, this maybe due to the lower labor force participation of females in many developing
countries, and therefore females are less likely to be in contact with public officials.
Surprisingly, although foreign firms are more likely to have contact with public officials,
the probability of having a payment requested at these incidents actually decreases. It
is also interesting to see firms that report tax rates, crimes, and power as moderate and
severe obstacles to the current operation are more likely to make a payment. Thus, while
high-markup firms are in more contact with public officials, the expected payment made
or requested is actually not significant for the high-markup firms. This result is puzzling
as high-markup firms are self-selected by the public officials, yet the amount of bribes paid
(expected) is negative. Next, the paper explores whether the high-markup firms are choosing
to not respond questions on payments.
2.4.3 Are high-markup firms more likely to not respond to cor-
ruption related questions?
The third sequence is to estimate the probability of the nonresponses to payment con-
tingent on firm’s contact with different public officials. Therefore, the paper compares this
aforementioned probability to the benchmark category, where firms respond to whether a
payment was made (either yes or no) conditional on the firm’s contact with a public official.
More specifically, the following probit model is estimated:
P (refit = 1|expit = 1&payit = miss) = Φ(β1markupit+β2Xit+β3obstaclesit+δc+δt+δj+it > 0)
(2.3)
Once again the dependent variable is a binary that takes on a value of one if the firm
refuses to answer the question on payments but made contact with a public official and zero
otherwise. All other firm-level controls and business obstacles remain same as equation 2.1.
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Table 2.8 presents the probit coefficients from estimating equation 2.3. The first row of
the table shows that an increase in markup, increases the probability of not responding to
the payment question. This positive correlation holds for payments made to tax officials and
operating licenses which are both significant at the 10% level. However, there is a negative
correlation between high-markup firms and attempts to secure government contracts. Since
the number of observations for government contract is relatively small, the results might
not be representative. Similarly, in column 5, the probit coefficient for payments on import
licenses is significant at the 10% level, but the significance disappears once fixed-effects are
added.
Other noteworthy variables include the manager’s level of experience which is mostly
negative and significant implying that the probability of not responding the payment question
decreases with an increase in the manager’s experience level. This result is interesting because
an increase in the manager’s experience also decreases the probability of a bribe payment,
and increases the probability of being in contact with a public official. Likewise, firms that
are predominately owned by the government (more than 50% ownership) are also more likely
to not respond to the payment question. This result is surprising because, as shown in the
previous section, state-owned enterprises (SOE) are less likely to make payments to obtain
one of the services. It also implies that information on corruption obtained from SOEs
could be underestimated and not accurate. Similarly, firms that report government official’s
interpretation of rules and laws as consistent are more likely to provide responses. This shows
the country’s legal and political institutions could be important in obtaining responses to
corruption-related questions. This is consistent with Jensen et al. (2010) who show the
country’s political environment determines the amount of nonresponses in firm-level data.
2.5 Conclusion
Beyond understanding the probability of exposure to a public officials and whether a
bribe is paid, my research explored the relationship between the high-markup firms and
nonresponses to corruption. I find strong empirical support that high-markup firms are
more likely to be exposed to corruption. For instance, high-markup firms are more likely to
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be visited by tax officials and more likely to secure a government contract. I also find that
high-markup firms are less likely to (expected to) pay bribes; however, the results also show
that the high-markup firms are more likely to not respond to the corruption-related question.
The results hold instances when a firm is visited by a tax official and applies for an import
and operating license. In contrast, the amount of nonresponses to payments on government
contract is negative implying that the exposure process can also determine the response rate
to corruption. My research sheds light on the potential biases caused by nonresponse in the
competition- corruption link. Further analysis needs to be done to look at the trade theories
behind the results.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics for Corruption Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Contact or Exposure to Bribe
tax inc 0.594 0.491 122771
gov inc 0.176 0.381 102178
imp inc 0.126 0.43 122543
ope inc 0.244 0.429 122548
Informal payment or gift requested or expected
tax pay 0.146 0.353 68883
gov pay 0.200 0.400 14423
imp pay 0.132 0.339 14459
ope pay 0.161 0.368 28152
Nonresponse to Bribe
tax ref 0.052 0.222 72675
gov ref 0.854 0.353 4137
imp ref 0.061 0.24 15404
ope ref 0.052 0.222 29689
Notes: All variables are described in table 2.9.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics: Level Markups by Sector
sector mean p25 p50 p75 sd
Textiles 1.781 0.526 0.900 1.604 3.755
Leather 2.255 0.423 0.750 1.699 5.432
Garments 1.849 0.507 0.846 1.573 4.242
Food 2.038 0.467 0.823 1.689 4.557
Metals and machinery 1.871 0.495 0.820 1.545 3.967
Electronics 2.113 0.496 0.827 1.655 4.788
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 1.911 0.499 0.857 1.660 4.256
Wood and furniture 1.872 0.446 0.744 1.471 4.534
Non-metallic and 1.870 0.478 0.839 1.608 4.178
Auto and auto components 1.731 0.578 0.859 1.674 4.022
Other manufacture 1.727 0.524 0.858 1.567 3.568
Retail and whole 2.294 0.426 0.861 1.904 5.256
Hotels and restaurant 1.761 0.496 0.820 1.470 3.993
Other services 2.291 0.405 0.771 1.778 5.338
Other: Construction 2.136 0.430 0.805 1.705 4.852
Total 2.024 0.468 0.834 1.672 4.593
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics: Level
Markups and firm-level determinants
Variables ln markup
exporter? Mean Obs
no 1.969482 79032
yes 2.245828 19380
female owner?
no 2.039468 68680
yes 1.987944 29732
certificate?
no 1.931493 76674
yes 2.349844 21738
ownership? mean
private 2.009957 90213
foreign 2.186867 7202
SOE 2.108523 997
Notes: Exporter is a dummy variable
(=yes) if firm is an exporter (percent-
age of the establishment’s direct and
indirect sales > 5), 0 otherwise. Cer-
tificate is a dummy variable (=yes)
if the firm has an internationally-
recognized quality certification, 0 oth-
erwise. Female is a dummy variable
(=yes) if firm is owned by female, 0
otherwise. Dummy variable (foreign)
if firm foreign owned (more than 50
% ownership by foreign individuals,
firms, or corporations); Dummy vari-
able (SOE) if firm SOE (more than 50
% ownership by government); Bench-
mark is the private owned firms.
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics for firm-level controls
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
female 0.296 0.457 124351
ln exp 2.679 0.687 120597
exp 16.336 11.365 123266
age 17.526 14.566 122201
ln age 2.656 0.738 122201
ownership 0.092 0.321 124351
exporter 0.201 0.401 124351
tax rates 0.311 0.463 124351
crime 0.192 0.394 124351
power 0.352 0.478 124351
gov off 0.089 0.285 124351
informal 0.251 0.433 124351
Notes: All variables are described in Ap-
pendix table 1.
Table 2.5: OLS regression of markup on firm-level determinants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ln markup ln markup ln markup ln markup ln markup
exporter 0.066*** 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.066*** 0.070***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
certificate 0.151*** 0.161*** 0.154*** 0.148*** 0.162***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014)
trans 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.063*** 0.051*** 0.062***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
finance -0.076*** -0.077*** -0.099*** -0.081*** -0.103***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009)
ln age 0.043*** 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.041***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
countryFE no no yes no yes
sectorFE no yes no no yes
timeFE no no no yes yes
Observations 97,296 97,296 97,296 97,296 97,296
R-squared 0.008 0.009 0.018 0.010 0.021
Notes: ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respec-
tively. Constants are included in the model but are not reported. Reported
values are estimated from OLS model with clustered standard errors at the
country-sector-year level in brackets. The dependent variable is log of markup.
All columns include various firm-level controls: ln(age), export status, binary on
certificate for quality, binary on whether access to finances and transportation
are considered an obstacle.
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Table 2.6: Probit model for Contact (Exposure) to Bribery
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES tax inc tax inc gov inc gov inc imp inc imp inc ope inc ope inc
ln markup 0.0434*** 0.0510*** 0.0302*** 0.0349*** 0.0896*** 0.102*** 0.0219*** 0.0299***
(0.00706) (0.00584) (0.00763) (0.00768) (0.00745) (0.00718) (0.00729) (0.00701)
forshare 0.221*** 0.194*** 0.0236 -0.0237 0.583*** 0.486*** 0.184*** 0.0451**
(0.0260) (0.0226) (0.0270) (0.0257) (0.0307) (0.0237) (0.0333) (0.0224)
govshare 0.0250 -0.0444 0.279*** 0.246*** -0.0282 0.147* 0.0224 0.101
(0.0715) (0.0894) (0.0829) (0.0779) (0.0843) (0.0789) (0.0763) (0.0709)
ln exp -0.0340** 0.0148 0.0775*** 0.0649*** 0.0723*** 0.0344*** -0.104*** 0.000830
(0.0147) (0.00952) (0.0122) (0.0110) (0.0160) (0.0117) (0.0151) (0.0114)
female -0.0111 0.0130 0.0448*** 0.0416*** 0.101*** 0.0415** 0.174*** 0.0930***
(0.0195) (0.0146) (0.0170) (0.0157) (0.0216) (0.0169) (0.0246) (0.0164)
tax rates 0.129*** 0.137*** 0.126*** 0.0765*** 0.0142 0.0204 0.0631*** 0.0637***
(0.0191) (0.0164) (0.0221) (0.0194) (0.0212) (0.0157) (0.0216) (0.0159)
ln age 0.00592 0.0955*** 0.0689*** 0.121*** 0.0896*** 0.0866*** -0.0495*** -0.0594***
(0.0129) (0.0115) (0.0125) (0.0107) (0.0189) (0.0121) (0.0170) (0.0113)
crime 0.0266 0.0285* 0.0452** 0.0299* 0.0946*** 0.00859 0.0672*** 0.0671***
(0.0196) (0.0159) (0.0197) (0.0177) (0.0233) (0.0171) (0.0228) (0.0175)
power 0.167*** 0.0356** -0.0342** 0.00987 0.0400 0.0231 0.0974*** 0.0442***
(0.0204) (0.0161) (0.0170) (0.0162) (0.0260) (0.0154) (0.0287) (0.0147)
gov off -0.0665 0.00380 -0.154*** -0.0329 0.0354 -0.0496* -0.140*** -0.0533*
(0.0418) (0.0217) (0.0464) (0.0377) (0.0382) (0.0258) (0.0434) (0.0272)
countryFE no yes no yes no yes no yes
sector FE no yes no yes no yes no yes
timeFE no yes no yes no yes no yes
Observations 94,857 94,857 78,233 78,233 94,759 94,759 94,933 94,933
r-square 0.00804 0.114 0.00751 0.0800 0.0261 0.140 0.0107 0.188
# depvar 12 179 12 173 12 179 12 179
% ones 0.594 0.594 0.176 0.176 0.126 0.126 0.244 0.244
conv 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Notes: ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. Constants are included in the
model but are not reported. Reported values are estimated from the probit model with clustered standard errors
at the country-sector-year level in brackets. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes on a value of
one if the respondent answers yes to the question on whether the firm applied for a services (government contract,
import, operating licenses) or was visited by a tax official, and zero if the respondent answers no. All columns
include firm’s ownership status, age, manager’s experience, gender of owner, business obstacles- crime, tax rates,
power, government interpretation of law as firm-level controls.
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Table 2.7: Probit model for whether a gift or informal payment is expected or requested
(1) ( 2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7 ) (8)
VARIABLES tax pay tax pay gov pay gov pay imp pay imp pay ope pay ope pay
ln markup 0.00163 0.00841 -0.0101 -0.0163 -0.00296 -0.0104 -0.00604 -0.000439
(0.00857) (0.00836) (0.0143) (0.0146) (0.0187) (0.0178) (0.0122) (0.0118)
forshare -0.110*** -0.0138 -0.188*** -0.177*** -0.0601 -0.0496 -0.152*** -0.0424
(0.0358) (0.0321) (0.0591) (0.0650) (0.0519) (0.0566) (0.0531) (0.0440)
govshare -0.146 -0.0988 -0.204 -0.325** -0.455* -0.606** -0.501*** -0.365**
(0.120) (0.114) (0.151) (0.163) (0.254) (0.276) (0.166) (0.178)
ln exp -0.123*** -0.00732 -0.0689*** -0.0191 -0.229*** -0.0341 -0.143*** -0.0399**
(0.0166) (0.0142) (0.0250) (0.0251) (0.0374) (0.0298) (0.0240) (0.0194)
female -0.0587** 0.0340* -0.00943 0.00204 0.0209 0.00426 -0.112*** 0.00220
(0.0228) (0.0204) (0.0351) (0.0327) (0.0406) (0.0407) (0.0314) (0.0305)
tax rates 0.181*** 0.257*** 0.169*** 0.234*** 0.109** 0.259*** 0.167*** 0.259***
(0.0222) (0.0189) (0.0351) (0.0355) (0.0476) (0.0390) (0.0299) (0.0277)
crime 0.0413 0.119*** 0.184*** 0.130*** 0.0153 0.153*** 0.0581* 0.171***
(0.0270) (0.0221) (0.0418) (0.0434) (0.0436) (0.0514) (0.0304) (0.0326)
power 0.250*** 0.0728*** 0.161*** 0.0456 0.262*** 0.0786 0.200*** 0.0476
(0.0269) (0.0196) (0.0363) (0.0381) (0.0650) (0.0524) (0.0405) (0.0327)
gov off -0.276*** -0.231*** 0.226*** -0.111 -0.440*** -0.116 -0.408*** -0.226***
(0.0461) (0.0333) (0.0814) (0.0895) (0.0787) (0.0843) (0.0566) (0.0579)
countryFE no yes no yes no yes no yes
sector FE no yes no yes no yes no yes
timeFE no yes no yes no yes no yes
Observations 54,366 53,810 11,591 11,269 11,455 10,389 22,798 21,775
r-square 0.0203 0.161 0.0157 0.159 0.031 0.211 0.0232 0.136
# depvar 11 178 11 172 11 178 11 178
% ones 0.146 0.146 0.2 0.2 0.132 0.132 0.161 0.161
conv 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Notes: ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. Constants are included in
the model but are not reported. Reported values are estimated from the probit model with clustered standard
errors at the country-sector-year level in brackets. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes on a
value of one if the respondent answers yes to the question on whether a gift or informal payment was requested
or expected, and zero if the respondent answers no. All columns include firm’s ownership status, age, manager’s
experience, gender of owner, business obstacles- crime, tax rates, power, government interpretation of law as
firm-level controls.
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Table 2.8: Probit model for nonresponses to payment-related questions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES tax ref tax ref gov ref gov ref imp ref imp ref ope ref ope ref
ln markup 0.0242** 0.0208* -0.0474** -0.0495* 0.0377* 0.0331 0.0427*** 0.0265*
(0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0241) (0.0288) (0.0220) (0.0224) (0.0149) (0.0155)
prishare 0.0299 0.161*** 0.0548 0.262* -0.0494 -0.000248 -0.0417 0.0674
(0.0384) (0.0396) (0.134) (0.151) (0.0635) (0.0661) (0.0600) (0.0641)
govshare 0.294** 0.0695 -0.150 -0.00177 0.509** 0.442* 0.359* 0.0972
(0.117) (0.133) (0.271) (0.273) (0.228) (0.258) (0.208) (0.207)
ln exp -0.0612*** -0.0231 -0.0531 -0.0143 -0.0905** -0.0406 -0.0760*** -0.0578**
(0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0515) (0.0567) (0.0357) (0.0405) (0.0249) (0.0256)
female -0.0434 -0.0461 -0.0647 -0.140** -0.00714 -0.0411 -0.0734** -0.0943**
(0.0265) (0.0295) (0.0598) (0.0647) (0.0499) (0.0521) (0.0335) (0.0380)
ln age 0.0168 0.0146 -0.0933* -0.00165 -0.0153 0.0321 0.00648 -0.0153
(0.0195) (0.0189) (0.0489) (0.0561) (0.0310) (0.0356) (0.0267) (0.0270)
tax rates -0.0143 0.0298 0.172*** 0.141** -0.0405 0.00205 0.0326 0.0233
(0.0274) (0.0268) (0.0625) (0.0699) (0.0505) (0.0560) (0.0372) (0.0404)
crime -0.0741** -0.00230 -0.163* -0.0716 -0.0794 -0.0295 -0.0646 -0.0526
(0.0340) (0.0333) (0.0875) (0.101) (0.0565) (0.0629) (0.0435) (0.0479)
power -0.151*** -0.0270 -0.0737 -0.111 -0.0889* 0.0429 -0.157*** -0.0388
(0.0297) (0.0267) (0.0673) (0.0762) (0.0463) (0.0543) (0.0424) (0.0444)
gov off -0.670*** -0.219*** -0.487** -0.126 -0.501*** -0.234** -0.676*** -0.293***
(0.0586) (0.0642) (0.191) (0.247) (0.104) (0.118) (0.0918) (0.106)
countryFE no yes no yes no yes no yes
sector FE no yes no yes no yes no yes
timeFE no yes no yes no yes no yes
Observations 56,899 54,355 3,038 2,812 12,053 10,799 23,807 22,087
r-square 0.0181 0.118 0.00876 0.201 0.0174 0.145 0.0192 0.134
# depvar 11 178 11 166 11 178 11 178
% ones 0.0522 0.0522 0.854 0.854 0.0613 0.0613 0.0518 0.0518
conv 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Notes: ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. Constants are included in
the model but are not reported.Reported values are estimated from the probit model with clustered standard
errors at the country-sector-year level in brackets. The dependent variable is a binary variable that takes on
a value of one if the respondent refuses to answer the question on payments contingent on having contact (or
exposure) to bribery. All columns include firm’s ownership status, age, manager’s experience, gender of owner,
business obstacles- crime, tax rates, power, government interpretation of law as firm-level controls.
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Table 2.9: Definition of variables from WBES
Incidence Variables
tax inc Over the last 12 months, was this establishment visited and or inspected by tax officials?
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers yes, 0 if the respondent answers no
Gov inc Over the last 12 months, has this establishment secured or attempted to secure a contract with the government?
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers yes, 0 if the respondent answers no
Imp inc Over the last two years, did this establishment submit an application to obtain an import license?
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers yes, 0 if the respondent answers no
Op inc Over the last two years, did this establishment submit an application to obtain an operating license?
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers yes, 0 if the respondent answers no
Payment expected or requested
Tax pay In any of these inspections or meetings was a gift or informal payment expected or requested?
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers yes and answers yes (=1) to tax inc,
0 if the respondent answers no and answers yes (=1) to tax inc
Gov pay what percent of the contract value would be typically paid in informal payments or gifts to secure the contract?
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers yes and answers yes (=1) to gov inc,
0 if the respondent answers no and answers yes (=1) to gov inc
Imp pay In reference to that application for an import license, was an informal gift or payment expected or requested?
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers yes and answers yes (=1) to imp inc,
0 if the respondent answers no and answers yes (=1) to imp inc
Op pay In reference to that application for an operating license, was an informal gift or payment expected or requested?
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers yes and answers yes (=1) to imp inc,
0 if the respondent answers no and answers yes (=1) to imp inc
Refused to answer (Nonresponses)
Tax ref Dummy variable (=1) if there is a missing observation for tax pay and tax inc =1,
0 if a response is provided to tax pay and tax inc =1
Gov ref Dummy variable (=1) if there is a missing observation for gov pay and gov inc =1,
0 if a response is provided to gov pay and gov inc =1
Imp ref Dummy variable (=1) if there is a missing observation for imp pay and imp inc =1,
0 if a response is provided to imp pay and imp inc =1
Op ref Dummy variable (=1) if there is a missing observation for op pay and op inc =1,
0 if a response is provided to op pay and op inc =1
Firm Characteristics
Ln age Log of survey year minus the established year
exporter Dummy (=1) if firm is an exporter (% of the establishments direct and indirect sales ¿ 5), 0 otherwise
forshare Dummy (=1) if firm foreign owned (more than 50 % ownership by foreign individuals, firms, or government)
govshare Dummy (=2) if firm foreign owned (more than 50% ownership by foreign individuals, firms, or government)
Ln exp Experience of the top manager in the establishments sector
Female Dummy variable (=1) if firm is owned by female, 0 otherwise.
certificate Dummy variable (=1) if the firm has an internationally-recognized quality certification, 0 otherwise
Total sales total annual sales in the previous year
Wage bill Total annual cost of labor (including wages, salaries, bonuses, social payments) in the previous year
Business constraints
crime Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers major obstacle, very severe to
the severity of crime, theft and disorder being an obstacle to the current operations of the establishment.
Dummy variable (=0) if the respondent answers no obstacle, minor obstacle, and moderate obstacle.
power Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers major obstacle, very severe to
the severity of electricity being an obstacle to the current operations of the establishment.
Dummy variable (=0) if the respondent answers no obstacle, minor obstacle, and moderate obstacle.
transport Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers major obstacle, very severe to
the severity of transportation of goods, supplies, and inputs being an obstacle.
Dummy variable (=0) if the respondent answers no obstacle, minor obstacle, and moderate obstacle.
Tax rates Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers major obstacle, very severe to the severity of tax rates.
Dummy variable (=0) if the respondent answers no obstacle, minor obstacle, and moderate obstacle.
Gov off Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers tend to agree, strongly agree to whether
the government officials interpretations of the laws and regulations affecting this establishment.
Dummy variable (=0) if the respondent answers strongly disagree, tend to disagree.
informal Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers major obstacle, very severe to the
severity of informal competition being an obstacle to the current operations of the establishment.
Dummy variable (=0) if the respondent answers no obstacle, minor obstacle, and moderate obstacle.
finance Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers major obstacle, very severe to the
severity of access to finance being an obstacle to the current operations of the establishment.
Dummy variable (=0) if the respondent answers no obstacle, minor obstacle, and moderate obstacle.
Sumi Sharma 60
Table 2.10: List of Countries in the sample
Country Obs Percent Cpercent Country Obs Percent Cper Country Obs Per Cper
Afghanistan 943 0.76 0.76 Gabon 179 0.14 31.05 Panama 969 0.78 68.72
Albania 664 0.53 1.29 Gambia 174 0.14 31.19 PapuaNewGuinea 63 0.05 68.77
Angola 785 0.63 1.92 Georgia 733 0.59 31.78 Paraguay 974 0.78 69.55
Antiguaandbarbuda 151 0.12 2.05 Ghana 1,214 0.98 32.76 Peru 1,632 1.31 70.86
Argentina 2,117 1.7 3.75 Grenada 153 0.12 32.88 Philippines 2,628 2.11 72.98
Armenia 734 0.59 4.34 Guatemala 1,112 0.89 33.77 Poland 997 0.8 73.78
Azerbaijan 770 0.62 4.96 Guinea 223 0.18 33.95 Romania 1,081 0.87 74.65
Bahamas 150 0.12 5.08 GuineaBissau 159 0.13 34.08 Russia 5,224 4.2 78.85
Bangladesh 2,946 2.37 7.45 Guyana 165 0.13 34.21 Rwanda 453 0.36 79.21
Barbados 150 0.12 7.57 Honduras 796 0.64 34.85 Samoa 102 0.08 79.29
Belarus 633 0.51 8.08 Hungary 601 0.48 35.34 Senegal 1,064 0.86 80.15
Belize 150 0.12 8.2 India 9,210 7.41 42.74 Serbia 747 0.6 80.75
Benin 150 0.12 8.32 Indonesia 2,743 2.21 44.95 Sierra Leone 150 0.12 80.87
Bhutan 476 0.38 8.7 Iraq 756 0.61 45.56 Slovak Republic 543 0.44 81.31
Bolivia 975 0.78 9.48 Israel 483 0.39 45.94 Slovenia 546 0.44 81.75
Bosnia and Herzegovina 718 0.58 10.06 Jamaica 376 0.3 46.25 Solomon Islands 148 0.12 81.87
Botswana 610 0.49 10.55 Jordan 565 0.45 46.7 SouthAfrica 937 0.75 82.62
Brazil 1,802 1.45 12 Kazakhstan 1,144 0.92 47.62 Southsudan 733 0.59 83.21
Bulgaria 1,594 1.28 13.28 Kenya 1,437 1.16 48.78 SriLanka 610 0.49 83.7
BurkinaFaso 394 0.32 13.6 Kosovo 468 0.38 49.15 StKittsandNevis 150 0.12 83.82
Burundi 424 0.34 13.94 Kyrgyz Republic 505 0.41 49.56 StLucia 150 0.12 83.94
Cambodia 793 0.64 14.58 LaoPDR 992 0.8 50.36 StVincentandGrenadines 154 0.12 84.07
Cameroon 363 0.29 14.87 Latvia 607 0.49 50.85 Sudan 647 0.52 84.59
CapeVerde 156 0.13 15 Lebanon 530 0.43 51.27 Suriname 152 0.12 84.71
Centralafricanrepublic 150 0.12 15.12 Lesotho 151 0.12 51.39 Swaziland 307 0.25 84.95
Chad 150 0.12 15.24 Liberia 150 0.12 51.51 Sweden 600 0.48 85.44
Chile 2,048 1.65 16.88 Lithuania 546 0.44 51.95 Tajikistan 719 0.58 86.02
China 2,700 2.17 19.06 Madagascar 960 0.77 52.72 Tanzania 1,232 0.99 87.01
Colombia 1,942 1.56 20.62 Malawi 661 0.53 53.26 Thailand 951 0.76 87.77
Congo 151 0.12 20.74 Malaysia 989 0.8 54.05 Timor Leste 150 0.12 87.89
Costarica 538 0.43 21.17 Mali 850 0.68 54.74 Timor-Leste 126 0.1 87.99
Croatia 992 0.8 21.97 Mauritania 358 0.29 55.02 Togo 155 0.12 88.12
Czech Republic 504 0.41 22.37 Mauritius 398 0.32 55.34 Tonga 150 0.12 88.24
Cte dIvoire 526 0.42 22.8 Mexico 2,960 2.38 57.72 TrinidadandTobago 370 0.3 88.54
DRC 1,228 0.99 23.79 Micronesia 67 0.05 57.78 Tunisia 592 0.48 89.01
Djibouti 266 0.21 24 Moldova 723 0.58 58.36 Turkey 2,496 2.01 91.02
Dominica 150 0.12 24.12 Mongolia 722 0.58 58.94 Uganda 1,325 1.07 92.08
DominicanRepublic 360 0.29 24.41 Montenegro 266 0.21 59.15 Ukraine 1,853 1.49 93.57
Ecuador 1,024 0.82 25.23 Morocco 406 0.33 59.48 Uruguay 1,228 0.99 94.56
Egypt 2,897 2.33 27.56 Mozambique 479 0.39 59.87 Uzbekistan 756 0.61 95.17
ElSalvador 693 0.56 28.12 Myanmar 632 0.51 60.37 Vanuatu 128 0.1 95.27
Elsalvador 360 0.29 28.41 Namibia 891 0.72 61.09 Venezuela 820 0.66 95.93
Eritrea 179 0.14 28.55 Nepal 850 0.68 61.77 Vietnam 2,045 1.64 97.58
Estonia 546 0.44 28.99 Nicaragua 814 0.65 62.43 West Bank And Gaza 434 0.35 97.93
Ethiopia 1,492 1.2 30.19 Niger 150 0.12 62.55 Yemen 776 0.62 98.55
Fiji 162 0.13 30.32 Nigeria 4,537 3.65 66.2 Zambia 1,204 0.97 99.52
Fyr Macedonia 726 0.58 30.91 Pakistan 2,164 1.74 67.94 Zimbabwe 599 0.48 100
Notes: List of country in the sample with number of observations (obs), percentages (percent), and cumulative percentages (cpercent).
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Chapter 3
Income Inequality, Ethnic Diversity,
and Corruption in the U.S. States
3.1 Introduction
According to the U.S. Department of Justice (henceforth, DOJ), between 1984-2005, a
total of 18,029 public officials (at the local, state, and federal level) were prosecuted for
corruption-related crimes. Relative to other Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) countries such as Germany, U.K., and Canada, the U.S. as a whole
is perceived to be more corrupt,1 although corruption levels vary widely across states. For
example, according to the DOJ between 1985-2005, there were 0.709 and 0.706 convictions
of public officials for corruption-related crimes per 100,000 population in South Dakota and
Louisiana respectively, while there were only 0.102 and 0.099 convictions of public officials for
corruption-related crimes per 100,000 population in New Hampshire and Oregon respectively
(see complete list in table 3.1). Why is it that states vary in the levels of corruption despite
the U.S. having strong economic and political institutions?
Of the studies that have been written on the subject, research shows income inequality as
a major source of corruption because as a society becomes more divided, the high-income in-
dividuals have the resources to engage in corruption to maintain their elite position (Glaeser
and Saks, 2006). However, other recent studies show that income inequality is a direct con-
1For example, according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of 2016, the
U.S. ranked 18th out of 168; whereas Canada, U.K., Germany ranked 9th, 10th, 10th out of 176 respectively.
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sequence of corruption because low-income individuals pay a higher share of income in bribes
compared to high-income individuals (Gupta et al., 2002). Therefore, the question I pose is
whether income inequality is a cause for or a consequence of corruption. Understanding this
relationship is important, not only to policy makers, but to Americans who face growing
income disparity and are directly affected by the consequences of corruption.
In the past 3 decades, the U.S. has seen a dramatic rise in the top income earnings and
several economists contend that this trend is likely to continue in the future (Piketty and
Saez, 2013). The gap between the rich and the poor has been continually widening, with the
top 1% earnerd 22% of income share in 2012 as compared to only 17 % in 2002. This figure
is much higher compared to the average of 9.6 times more for OECD countries. Similarly,
the Gini Index was 0.64 in 2012 compared to 0.58 in 2002. My research shows that income
inequality, more specifically increases in the top income share, is one of the key ingredients
that has exacerbated the variation in state level corruption.
My empirical approach adapts You and Khagram (2005) cross-country study that exam-
ines the bidirectional relationship between income inequality and corruption. They illustrate
two potential channels through which income inequality increases corruption. First, in more
democratic countries, wealthy individuals have the resources to engage in corruption and
produce policy outcomes closely favorable to them at the cost of the poor. Second, the rise
in income inequality affects individual perception and widens the norm for the acceptability
of corruption. My hypothesis is that, for a democratic country like the U.S., income inequal-
ity across states can explain the rise in corruption, which implies that income inequality and
corruption measures should be positively correlated.
I examine income inequality using the top 1% and top 0.1 % income share, and Gini
coefficient. I choose to include the top 1% income shares since most of the changes observed
in U.S. income inequality throughout the twentieth century are predominately observed at
this end of distribution (Piketty and Saez, 2013). In addition, the top income earners are
likely to have the resources and political connections to engage in corruption. With the
traditional broad based indicators (namely the Gini and Atkinson Indexes), it is difficult to
breakdown the components to determine which subgroup is contributing to overall inequality.
Similarly, in a more recent paper, Aghion et al. (2015) also highlight the importance of using
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top income shares as a measure of income inequality rather than broad based indicators.
They find increases in the top 1% income share is likely associated with increases in growth
from innovation; however, the result is insignificant for broad income inequality measures.
Corruption is measured by a conviction-based measure from the DOJ and a perception-
based measure from Boylan and Long (2003). The conviction-based measure has panel
data on all 48 mainland states from 1984-2002, while the perception-based measure has
information on only 45 states for the year 1998. Finally, I explicitly control for ethnic
diversity to clearly understand the relation between income inequality and corruption levels.
Studies have shown that when a society is more diverse, politicians tend to allocate resources
that favor their own ethnic groups (or voters) . In return, the diverse group (or voters) will
continue to support politicians of their own ethnicity, despite knowing their corrupt behavior
(Glaeser and Saks, 2006).
The main results can be summarized as follows. The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) results
suggest there is a positive and statistically significant correlation between top income earners
and state level corruption. A 10% increase in income share for the top 1% and top 0.1%
are associated with an increase of 1.47% and 0.75%, respectively, in the rates of corruption.
Similarly, a 10% increase in Gini is associated with an increase in rates of corruption by
about 7.5%. Several studies have shown that the causal link runs from corruption to income
inequality; therefore, it is plausible that the baseline empirical model is endogenous. If this
is true, the OLS results will be biased. To mitigate these concerns and to further ensure
robustness of the results, I include three instruments: state slave share in 1860, mature age
cohort size, and median household income in 1970. The instruments have no direct relation
with corruption but are correlated with the income inequality variables. The instruments
pass the validity and exogeneity tests in the 2SLS model. The results from the IV 2SLS are
analogous to the OLS results but with a higher economic magnitude. This finding confirms
that the OLS results are biased downwards due to endogeneity. More specifically, a 10%
increase in the top 1% income share increases the rates of corruption by 3.25% and a 10%
increase in the top 0.1% income share increases the rates of corruption by 2.10%. The results
confirm the hypothesis that an increase in income inequality increases the rates of corruption
as measured by the conviction-based index. However, the results are not consistent for the
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perception-based corruption index; therefore, the paper mostly focuses on the state-level
conviction-based index that has been extensively used in the literature.2
This paper is the first, to my knowledge, to analyze the effect of income inequality as
measured by the income share held by the top 1% and top 0.1% on state-level corruption
in the U.S. States. Much of the research for the U.S. consists of examining the effect of
corruption on the Gini and the Atkinson Indexes (Dincer and Gunalp (2012), Apergis et al.
(2010)) or the effect of the Gini (in 1970) on state-level corruption (Glaeser and Saks (2006)).
However, these papers do not discuss the importance of the higher income earners. As stated
previously, it is likely the income held by the top 1% (ultra-rich) matters the most as they
have the resources to engage in corruption. The Gini index, by contrast, is non-decomposable
which makes it difficult to look at different income subgroups (Frank, 2009).
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 discusses previous literature between income
inequality and corruption, section 3 provides an overview of the data, and section 4 provides
an empirical analysis with the OLS and IV results. Lastly, section 5 highlights the main
conclusions.
3.2 Corruption and Income Inequality
Income inequality and corruption are closely related and recent studies find that cor-
ruption has a positive effect on income inequality in the United States (Dincer and Gunalp
(2012), Apergis et al. (2010)) and in Africa (Gyimah-Brempong (2002)), but a negative effect
in Latin America (Andres and Ramlogan-Dobson (2011)). Dincer and Gunalp (2012) use
Current Population Survey (CPS) data and test whether state-level corruption has an effect
on income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient and Atkinson indexes, for 1981-1997.
They find evidence that an increase in corruption leads to an increase in income inequality
in the U.S. States. The results are consistent when the authors control for endogeneity in
a Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) model. Similarly, Apergis et al. (2010) investi-
gate the Granger causality from corruption to income inequality (Gini) using a panel vector
2For instance, see Glaeser and Saks (2006), Goel and Nelson (1998), Leeson and Sobel (2008), and Johnson
et al. (2010).
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error correction mode. For the U.S. states between 1980-2004, the authors find a positive
bidirectional relationship between the income inequality and corruption in the short-run and
the long-run.
Alternatively, Glaeser and Saks (2006) test the effect of median household income and
Gini coefficient, both for 1970, on average corruption from 1976-2002 for the U.S. States.
They use income from 1940 and a quadratic function of latitude and longitude as instruments
for the median household income3 while subjecting their empirical testing to include a wide
set of controls such as racial and ethnic fractionalization, urban population, college degree,
and share of government employment. Glaeser and Saks conclude that states with higher
income and education are less likely to be corrupt; however, they also find that states with
higher income inequality and racial heterogeneity are more corrupt.
Therefore, it is not only possible that state-level corruption increases income inequality,
but as income inequality increases, the state-level corruption can increase as well. According
to Uslaner (2008), this vicious cycle is known as the “inequality traps” and leads to more
income inequality and corruption in a nation. In a similar vein, You and Khagram (2005)
find evidence that an increase in income inequality, especially in democracies, increases
corruption. They use data on Corruption Perception Indexes and Gini Coefficient from 129
countries. According to Meltzer and Richard (1981), for regions that are more economically
divided, poorer citizens will pressure government for redistributive policies more favorable
towards them (aimed towards the lower end of the income distribution). For example, this
could be done by pressuring the state for a tax increase on the rich which will decline their
income share. As a result, the wealthy have a greater incentive to engage in political and
bureaucratic corruption to avoid paying higher taxes and to evade tax payments altogether
as stated by You and Khagram (2005). Furthermore, poor individuals are also likely to
engage in “petty corruption” to ensure these public services are providedto them (You and
Khagram, 2005).The paper concludes by stating that the effect of income inequality on
corruption is magnified in more democratic societies compared to dictatorships. The main
reason is that the rich have the means to engage and rely on corruption to direct favorable
policy outcomes since “repression of the mass” is not easy in a democracy.
3Note: For the Gini Coefficient, the authors only report the OLS result.
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Several studies at the national level have examined the effects of ethnic diversity on levels
of corruption. Why might ethnic diversity play a role in determining the rates of corruption?
Mauro (1995) claims that regions with high ethnic-linguistic fractionalization reduce the
likelihood of holding a corrupt official accountable. Likewise, other studies show corruption
more pervasive in countries that are ethnically fragmented (Treisman (2000b), Alesina et al.
(2003), LaPorta et al. (1999)). For the U.S., Glaeser and Saks (2006) argue that politicians
tend to allocate resources toward their own ethnicity and these ethnic groups continue to
support the same politicians despite knowing about their corrupt behavior. Dincer (2008)
finds a positive and linear relationship between ethnic and religious diversity and corruption
within the U.S. States.4 Hence, by including a control for ethnic diversity, I aim to clearly
elucidate the income inequality and corruption link. All else equal, the hypothesis is that
states with greater ethnic heterogeneity are more likely to be corrupt.
Based on the aforementioned research, this paper will address the effects of income in-
equality on corruption in the U.S. States. The focus of this paper is on the U.S. because,
despite being one of the strongest democracies in the world, the disparity in income has
been continually widening in the past 3 decades. In addition, the U.S. has seen a growing
disparity in politics where the top 1% have substantial power to influence public policies
favorable to them. This paper advances the literature by focusing on the importance of the
top 1% and top 0.1% income share in determining the levels of corruption.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Corruption
First, the number of federal convictions for corruption-related crimes are obtained from
Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of Public Integrity Section (U.S. De-
partment of Justice). The focus of the PIN is to investigate public corruption, ranging
from election crimes and conflicts of interest crimes to campaign finance violations (Section,
4Glaeser and Saks (2006) use data from the 1980 Census for ethnic diversity. They run a cross-section
OLS with 50 observations. Dincer (2008) use 10 year averages from 1980-1989 and 1990-1999 for ethnic
diversity. They run a pooled OLS with 96 observations.
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2011). According to the DOJ, a local case is handled at the federal level for four different
scenarios: to ensure fairness if the government official being prosecuted has strong ties to
the government, cases falling under multiple jurisdictions, cases referred directly from federal
agencies, and cases requiring extra resources or shared responsibilities. For the main mea-
sure of corruption, I use the annual rate of corruption (CONVICTION) which is defined as
the number of federal-convictions of public officials per 100,000 state population. Based on
averages from 1984-2005, South Dakota, Louisiana, and Alaska were the top three corrupt
states, while Oregon, New Hampshire, and Washington were three least corrupt states. This
type of data was originally published in Glaeser and Saks (2006) where the rate of corrup-
tion for each state is defined as the number of federal convictions per state divided by the
average state population. Similar measures have been used in the literature by Goel and
Nelson (1998), Leeson and Sobel (2008), and Johnson et al. (2010) to measure corruption
across states
Second, I use a time-series average of state level corruption from 1976-2002 (STATE AVG).
This data is obtained from Glaeser and Saks (2006). The authors cite the use of time-series
average to mitigate the year-to-year fluctuation in the corruption index. Therefore, by using
this measure, I ensure comparability of my results with other papers that have utilized this
time-frame. For the time-series average from 1976-2002, the top three corrupt states are
Alaska, Mississippi, and Louisiana and the three least corrupt states are Colorado, Wiscon-
sin, and Nebraska.
Third, I include a perception-based (PERCEPTION) measure introduced by Boylan and
Long (2003). The authors survey 300 state reporters that deal with state politics to determine
the perception of public corruption. The reporters were asked to rate their state in terms
of level of corruption of all government employees (elected officials, political appointees, and
civil servants) on a scale from one (least corrupt) to seven (more corrupt). The reporter’s
average response for each state is included as the perception-based index. Their study
identifies the top three corrupt states as Rhode Island, Louisiana, and New Mexico and
three least states as Colorado, North Dakota, and South Dakota.
Although the measures differ on how to estimate corruption, the conviction-based mea-
sure is likely superior and I refer to it closely in this paper. The fundamental difference
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is the DOJ measure uses actual federal conviction rather than relying on the perception of
individuals.5 The use of the conviction-based measure provides an estimate of the actual
level of state-corruption and provides evidence of “culture of corruption” in a state.
3.3.2 Income Inequality
The data for share of income of the top 1% to top 0.01% for the U.S. States comes from
The World Wealth and Income Database. The data was originally published at the US State-
Level Income Inequality Database by Frank (2009). The Database contains information on
total income earned (both pre-tax and pre-transfer) by individuals at the top tail of the
income distribution. The data is based on the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) individual tax
returns and includes wages, entrepreneurial income, and capital gains.6 A major advantage
of the data is its availability from 1913 onwards for all the U.S. states. The IRS, however,
does not report data below a certain threshold of income which makes it difficult, although
not impossible, to estimate the lower income shares.
The U.S. State-Level Income Inequality Database also provides data on the Gini coef-
ficient (Gini), Atkinson Index (0.5), and Theil Index. According to Frank (2009), Gini is
defined as “representing the average distance between all pairs of proportional income in the
population” (p.256). Theoretically, Gini is bounded between zero (perfect equality) and one
(perfect inequality). A problem associated with using Gini is that it is non-decomposable
which makes it difficult to look at inequality within different income subgroups. It is, there-
fore, possible for subgroups within a population to exhibit higher rates of inequality, while
the aggregate Gini would show an overall decrease (Frank, 2009). Figure 3.2 plots the aver-
age values of the Gini coefficient from 1984-2004 and figure 3.1 plots the top income share
for different categories from 1920 onwards.
5For detailed discussion, see Glaeser and Saks (2006) for a discussion on the advantages of using the
conviction-based measure. The authors point out that the DOJ measure is more objective and independent
of the state’s judicial law. The authors also argue that this mitigates the problem associated with a corrupt
state not prosecuting a corrupt official. The federal judicial system is independent of the local corruption
and “... should treat people similarly across space”(p. 1054).
6Note that capital gains include dividends, interests, rents, and royalties. Notable exclusions are the state
and federal transfers, interest on state and local bonds. For more information, see Frank (2009).
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3.3.3 Ethnic diversity
The data for ethnic diversity (ETHNIC) comes from the Census Bureau for the year
2000. Following the literature, ETHNIC denotes the probability of two randomly selected
individuals belonging to two different ethnic groups. More specifically, ETHNIC is calculated
as:
ethnic = 1−
n∑
e=1
(sie)
2 (3.1)
where sie is the population share of ethnic group e in each state i and n is the total ethnic
groups. In my sample, e = White, Asian, Hispanic, and Black for the year 2000. ETHNIC
ranges between zero and one, where zero a state with complete homogeneity and one signifies
a state with complete ethnic heterogeneity. The former signifies that everyone belongs to
the same ethnic group.
3.3.4 Other Controls
I also control for different state-level characteristics that can potentially effect the cor-
ruption rates. Following Glaeser and Saks (2006), I control for the percentage of population
with a college education (EDU, year 1984-2002), population (POP, year 1984-2002), and
share of government employment relative to state population (GOVSH, year 1984-2002).
The data for EDU comes from the Census, POP and GOVSH from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. Further, I control for four geographic regions to be consistent with the Census
Bureau categories: Northeast, South, Midwest, and West.
Table 3.2 provides summary statistics for the variables used in this paper. The average
rate of conviction is 0.31 per 100,000 state population with a standard deviation of 0.27. The
average perception score for the perception-based measure is 3.48 with a standard deviation
of 1.15. A detailed summary on the states that are included in each corruption measure
are outlined in table 3.5. On average, the top 10% income share is about 40 % while the
top 1% income share is about 14 %. About 23% of the population has a college degree or
higher. The mean of ethnic diversity is 0.316 and the share of government employment is
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about 15%.
3.4 Econometric Analysis
3.4.1 Baseline Specification
In order to estimate the effect of income inequality on state-level corruption, I estimate
the following regression equation:
corruptionit = β1(income inequalityit) + β2(ethnici2000) + β3(Xit) + ηi + τt + it (3.2)
where subscript i denotes the 48 mainland states from 1984-2002. Income inequality
includes the Gini coefficient, the top 10%, top 1%, top 0.1%, top 0.01% income share
for the time period 1984-2002. Corruption denotes the number of federal convictions per
100,000 state population for each year (CONVICTION), the time-series average corruption
(STATE AVG) from Glaeser and Saks (2006), and a perception-based index (PERCEP-
TION) from Boylan and Long (2003). Both income inequality and corruption variables are
measured in logs.7 Ethnic diversity is denoted as ETHNIC and is calculated for the year
2000. Xit is a set of control variables that include percentage of population with a college
education (EDU, 1984-2002) and share of government employment relative to population
(GOVSH, 1984-2002). ηj and τt represent region and time-fixed effects, respectively.
3.4.2 OLS Results
The first result reported (in table 3.4) is for the OLS regressions where the dependent
variable is the number of federal convictions of public officials per 100,000 state population
(CONVICTION). The independent variables include the top 10%, top 1%, top 0.5%, top
0.1%, top 0.01% income share, and the Gini Coefficient. All columns include log trans-
formations of ethnic diversity (ETHNIC), share of government employment (GOVSH), and
college education (EDU). Further, all columns include region and time fixed-effects. The
final balanced panel includes 864 observations for the 48 mainland states from 1984-2002.
7The log transformation takes the form of ln(x+1) to keep observations that might include 0.
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Table 3.4 shows that the effect of income inequality on rates of corruption is always
positive and significant. For the top income shares (Column 1-5), the coefficients are positive
and statistically significant at the 5% level and 1% level, respectively. A 10% increase
in the income share of the top 1% and top 0.1 %are associated with an increase in the
rates of corruption by 1.47% and 0.75%, respectively. The point estimates show that a one
standard deviation (0.1) increase in the top 0.1% income share is associated with a 0.021
point increase in CONVICTION. This amounts to 11.3 % of a standard deviation. For the
top 1% income share, a one standard deviation (0.211) increase is associated with an increase
of 0.0310 in CONVICTION. This amounts to approximately 17% of a standard deviation in
CONVICTION. Column 6 shows a 10% increase in Gini is associated with a 7.5% increase
in CONVICTION, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. In other words, a one
standard deviation (0.06) increase is associated with an increase in CONVICTION of about
24% of a standard deviation.
It is often argued that corruption increases with the share of government employees
(GOVSH), level of ethnic diversity (ETHNIC), and decreases with the education levels
(EDU). After including these variables as controls, I find that ETHNIC and GOVSH are
positively and significantly associated with CONVICTION, while higher EDU is negatively
and significantly associated with CONVICTION. The results for ETHNIC suggest that a
10% increase in ETHNIC (or greater ethnic diversity) increases the rates of corruption by
0.6%. The magnitude on ETHNIC is similar and statistically significant at the 1% level in
all columns. These results are consistent with the previous research that find a positive effect
of ethnic diversity on corruption levels in the U.S. states (see Dincer (2008) and Glaeser and
Saks (2006))
In table 3.5, I include the state time-series average (STATE AVG) for corruption from
1976-2002 as the main dependent variable. The data was originally published in Glaeser
and Saks (2006). The results in all columns are positive and statistical significant at the 1%
level implying a strong correlation between the top income inequality and corruption across
the states. Next, in table 3.6, I look at two things. First, the coefficients in columns 1-3
are estimated using a panel OLS with region and time fixed-effects, while the coefficients in
columns 4-6 are estimated with a cross-section OLS, with averages from 1976-2002, including
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region fixed-effects. The results are similar to those obtained in table 3 but with much
lower magnitudes on the independent variables. A 10% increase in the top 10% income
share increases STATE AVG corruption by 1.6% (compared to 2.15% in table 2, column
1). Similarly, a 10% increase in the top 1% income share and the Gini are associated with
an increase of 1.1% and 5.2% (compared to 1.4% and 7.5% in table 3, column 2 and 3) in
STATE AVG, respectively.
Finally, I include the perception-based corruption measure (PERCEPTION) on the right
hand side of equation 2 (3.7). The coefficients in columns 1-3 are estimated using a panel
OLS with region and time fixed-effects, while the coefficients in columns 4-6 are estimated
with a cross-section OLS and includes region fixed-effects (in table 6). The sample size is
much smaller in table 3.7 compared to table 3.6 3.5 because we only have information on 45
states.8 The results provide mixed evidence. The first column shows that a 10% increase
for the top 10% income share is associated with a 2.5% increases in the perception-based
corruption measure, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. Column 2 shows that,
by contrast, the point estimate of the top 1% income share is actually negative and does
not enter the equation significantly. Similarly, column 3 shows that the effect of Gini on
PERCEPTION is negative and significant at the 1% level.
The results presented above support the hypothesis that the top level income inequality
is likely an important factor for state-level corruption. The results, however, cannot be
interpreted as causal since corruption and income inequality are likely interdependent. I
introduce three different instruments to test the exogenous variation in income inequality,
in the next section.
3.4.3 Instrumental Variables and 2SLS Results
A problem arises with the OLS estimation because corruption is likely endogenous in
the model. As a consequence, there is the possibility that corruption may be endogenous to
income inequality. Gupta et al. (2002) and Dincer and Gunalp (2012) provide an overview
of why corruption can lead to income inequality, which can be summarized in three main
8Refer to Appendix 1 for a list of states in the sample.
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reasons: first, corruption generates a tax system that suits the rich and can lead to tax
evasion, lower tax revenues, and reduced welfare programs that benefit the poor. Secondly,
when there is a high concentration of asset ownership within a small interest group, these
groups can use their wealth to influence public policy. For example, pushing for tax policies
favorable to the rich or increasing spending on programs that will increase returns on their
assets. Thirdly, corruption can reduce resources available for social programs which are
put in place for the low-income individuals. Corruption, therefore, diverts resources from
infrastructure building programs to programs where bribes can be easily extracted.
To address endogeneity, and to follow the literature, I have identified three potential
instruments that are correlated with different income inequality variables (the endogenous
variable) and uncorrelated with the rates of corruption. First, I include state slave share
from 1860. Bertocchi and Dimico (2014) show that U.S. counties with a higher share of
slaves relative to total population in 1860 are more unequal today. In particular, a one
percent increase in slave share is associated with a statistically significant 0.045 increase in
overall income inequality. Bertocchi and Dimico (2014) discuss two main reasons for the
persistence of long-term income inequality seen today. The first is the differences in human
capital attainment (or educational inequality) of blacks relative to whites, which accumulated
overtime resulting in overall income inequality. The second reason is the racial discrimination
mechanism, which prevented blacks from acquiring skills and depressed wages resulting in
income inequality.
The use of slave share, however, has its concerns. There is information on only 40 of the 48
mainland states which reduces the number of observation from 864 to 720. For the remaining
40 states, there is a large variation in slave shares between 0 and 55 %. Nonetheless, I exploit
the difference in slave shares across states to understand the impact of income inequality
on rates of corruption today. Slave share is likely to have no relationship between rates of
corruption, the dependent variable, which makes it a relevant instrument.
Second, I include mature cohort size defined as the proportion of adult population (age
16-59) who are between the age of 40-59. Higgins and Williamson (1999) show that “large
working-age cohorts are associated with a lower income inequality, whereas large young-age
cohorts are associated with a higher income inequality” (p. 4). While COHORT is likely to
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be correlated with the income inequality measures, it is unlikely to be correlated with the
conviction-based corruption measure. Both Leigh (2006) and You and Khagram (2005) have
instrumented income inequality with the mature cohort size.
Third, I consider median household income in 1970 as an instrument for income inequality
today. Starting out with a high household median income in 1970 can be a strong predictor
of the top income share.
Table 3.8 presents the IV results using two staged-least squares (2SLS) based on the
econometric specification analogous to those reported in table 3-5. I perform several diag-
nostic tests to assess the reliability of the IV 2SLS model. First, I employ the Hansen-J
statistics which tests the joint validity of instruments when there are more instruments than
endogenous variables. The results in all four columns show that the null hypothesis of the va-
lidity of instruments cannot be rejected. Second, I report the F-test (the Kleibergen-Paap rk
Wald F-statistic) from the first stage regressions. The first-stage F-test range between 46-53
which show that the instrumental variables are relevant and reject the joint insignificance at
a 1% level. Third, I report the Shea partial-R2 that considers the intercorrelations between
instruments. The Shea partial-R2 ranges from 0.068-0.219 implying that the instruments
are valid.
After confirming the relevance and validity of the instruments, I now look at the co-
efficients on the income inequality variables. First, I report the 2SLS for cases where the
dependent variable is the conviction-based corruption (CONVICTION). The columns re-
port the result for the top 1% to top 0.01% income share for only the 40 states that are
listed in the slave share data from Bertocchi and Dimico (2014). The three instruments
include: slave share relative to state population (SLAVE), mature cohort size (COHORT),
and median income from 1970 (INC1970).
The effect of income inequality on corruption is positive and statistically significant in
all columns. The economic magnitudes of the results are quiet large as well. A 10% increase
in the top 1% income share increases the conviction-based measure by 3.25% and a 10%
increase in the top 0.1% income share increases the conviction-based corruption measure by
2.10%. To put this in perspective, a one standard deviation increase in top 1% income share
(0.1) is associated with a 0.0325 point increase or about 17 % of an increase in the standard
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deviation of CONVICTION. Similarly, a one standard deviation in top 0.1% income share
(0.211) is associated with a 0.084 point increase or almost a 45.40% of a standard deviation
increase in CONVICTION. The results continue to hold for the top 0.01 and top 0.5% as
well. Moreover, the estimated effects in all cases are much larger for the 2SLS compared to
the OLS model. Also note that the estimated coefficients on ETHNIC, GOVSH and EDU
retains their signs and are statistically significant at the 1% level.
Next, I look at the 2SLS for the average time-series rates of corruption (STATE AVG)
in table 3.9. Once again, the instruments pass several diagnostic tests for validity and
exogeneity. The F-test in all columns are strong (33.09, 25.80, 54.79, respectively) and easily
reject the null hypothesis of the joint insignificance of the instruments. The Hansen J-stat
for columns (2) and (3) are strong and the validity of the null hypothesis cannot be rejected
(0.37 and 4.2, respectively). However, the Hansen J-Stat for column (1) is about 5.8 with a
χ2 p-value of 0.054 which makes it possible to reject the validity of instruments at the 10%
level. Keeping these results in mind, I now interpret the 2SLS results with the instrumented
coefficient on income inequality. In the first column, the results show that a 10% increase in
the top 10% income share increases the state time-series average corruption (STATE AVG)
by 3%. In the second column, a 10% increase in the top 1% increases STATE AVG by 1.8%.
Likewise, in the third column, a 10% increase in Gini increases STATE AVG by 3.1%. In all
columns, the results are statistically significant at the 1 % level. The estimated coefficients
on income inequality are much higher compared to the OLS model reported in table 5.
Lastly, in table 3.10 I look at the 2SLS for CONVICTION after controlling for different
sectors share: financial, mining, and oil and gas extraction in total state GDP. The motiva-
tion of this exercise is to test whether the relationship between top income inequality and
corruption across states is driven by higher state shares in these sectors. Therefore, I control
for the share of finance, mining, and oil and gas extration in total state GDP to see whether
the results continue to hold. After controlling for the sector shares, the results continue to
remain significant and the coefficients are similar to table 3.8.
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3.5 Conclusion
This paper shows that income inequality measured by the top income inequality and the
Gini coefficient have a substantial positive and significant effect on corruption across the
U.S. States. Moreover, the effect on corruption is magnified when the three instruments:
state slave share in 1860, cohort size, and income from 1970 are used in an IV 2SLS model.
In particular, the results support the hypothesis by You and Khagram (2005) which states
income inequality is an important ingredient for the causes of corruption in a democratic
country. Therefore, reducing income inequality would significantly reduce corruption at the
state-level. Although previous research have tested the relation between the Gini Index and
corruption for the U.S. States; to my knowledge, this is the first evidence that highlights the
importance of the top income inequality (more specificially, the top 1%, top 0.1%) as a cause
of corruption. Given that corruption and unequal distribution of income are detrimental to a
nation’s long-term economic growth, these results recommend a redistributive policy reform
in the U.S. to tackle corruption.
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Figure 3.1: Income Share in the United States 1912-2013. Source: The World Wealth and
Income Database
0
10
20
30
40
50
1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
year
Top10_adj Top5_adj
Top1_adj Top05_adj
Top01_adj
Figure 3.2: Gini in the United States 1912-2013: Source: Frank (2009)
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Table 3.1: Conviction Rates (average yearly convictions divided average pop from 1985-2005)
State Corruption Rate State Corruption Rate
South Dakota .709 Rhode Island .295
Louisiana .7063 Maine .2859
Alaska .701 South Carolina .2683
Mississippi .6844 Texas .2584
North Dakota .6298 Connecticut .2511
Montana .5438 California .2509
Kentucky .5037 Arizona .2454
Illinois .5024 Arkansas .2433
Virginia .4695 New Mexico .2306
Alabama .4501 Indiana .228
Tennessee .449 Idaho .2269
New York .4336 Michigan .2244
Ohio .4202 North Carolina .2048
Florida .4047 Vermont .1996
Pennsylvania .3854 Nevada .1887
West Virginia .3745 Kansas .1831
New Jersey .3637 Wisconsin .1778
Delaware .3533 Iowa .1775
Georgia .3441 Colorado .1664
Hawaii .34417 Nebraska .1611
Wyoming .3431 Minnesota .1461
Maryland .3408 Utah .1334
Oklahoma .3269 Washington .1259
Missouri .3211 New Hampshire .102
Massachusetts .3069 Oregon .0994
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Corruption
log(conviction) 0.252 0.185 912
conviction 0.31 0.274 912
log(perception) 1.465 0.274 855
perception 3.487 1.152 855
log(avg state) 0.233 0.096 912
avg state 0.268 0.124 912
Income Inequality
Top10 adj 39.604 4.195 912
Top1 adj 14.214 3.599 912
Top0.5 adj 9.648 3.981 912
Top0.1 adj 4.909 2.867 912
Top0.01 adj 1.862 1.544 912
gini(*100) 55.637 3.374 931
Controls
edu 23.706 4.310 912
govsh 15.348 2.709 864
log(pop) 15.039 0.986 912
ethnic 0.316 0.142 912
Instruments
slave share 0.114 0.176 760
ln(cohort) 0.392 0.018 912
ln(income1970) 8.233 0.155 912
Notes: Conviction is the number of convictions per
100,000 state population. Avg state is the state
time-series average corruption per 100,000 popu-
lation from 1976-2002 obtained from Glaeser and
Saks (2006). Perception is the perception-based cor-
ruption indicator based on reporters survey for the
1999 obtained from Boylan and Long (2003). Top
10%, top 1%, top 0.5%, top 0.1%, top 0.01% are
the income share for different groups. Gini is the
measure of income inequality where 100 represents
perfect equality.Control variables include ethnic di-
versity, share of government employment relative to
total population, percentage of population with a
college degree, state population. Instruments in-
clude slave share in 1860 obtained fromBertocchi
and Dimico (2014), mature cohort size as a ratio
40−59
15−69 age group, log income in 1970.
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Table 3.4: OLS Regression of Corruption and Income Inequality from 1984-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DEP VARIABLE CONVICTION
Top 10% 0.216**
(0.098)
Top 1% 0.147***
(0.047)
Top 0.5% 0.107**
(0.042)
Top 0.1% 0.075**
(0.034)
Top 0.01% 0.059**
(0.030)
Gini 0.750***
(0.182)
ln edu -0.227*** -0.228*** -0.234*** -0.235*** -0.234*** -0.232***
(0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
ln ethnic 0.064*** 0.060*** 0.063*** 0.066*** 0.069*** 0.058***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
ln govemp sh 0.300*** 0.317*** 0.313*** 0.303*** 0.295*** 0.241***
(0.051) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.052) (0.047)
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 864 864 864 864 864 864
R-squared 0.187 0.191 0.190 0.188 0.187 0.206
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Constants are included in the model but not reported. Robust standard errors in
brackets. All columns include region and time fixed- effects. The dependent variable (in
logs) is the average corruption per 100,000 population. The independent variables (in logs)
are top 10% , top 1% , top 0.5%, top 0.1%, top 0.01% income share, and Gini respectively.
Control variables include ethnic diversity, share of government employment, and percentage
of population with a college degree.
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Table 3.5: OLS Regression of STATE AVG and Income Inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES STATE AVG STATE AVG STATE AVG STATE AVG
Top 1% 0.113***
(0.015)
Top 0.5% 0.063***
(0.015)
Top 0.1% 0.046***
(0.012)
Top 0.01% 0.036***
(0.010)
ln edu -0.227*** -0.231*** -0.231*** -0.231***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
ln ethnic 0.066*** 0.068*** 0.070*** 0.072***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ln govemp sh 0.275*** 0.270*** 0.265*** 0.260***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Region FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 864 864 864 864
R-squared 0.516 0.513 0.512 0.510
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: ∗ ∗ ∗ ,∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
levels, respectively. Constants are included in the model but not reported.
Robust standard errors in brackets. All columns include region and time fixed-
effects. The dependent variable (in logs) in all columns is the state time -series
average corruption per 100,000 population from 1976-2002. The independent
variables (in logs)are top 1% , top 0.5%, top 0.1%, and top 0.01% income share
from 1984-2002 respectively. Control variables include ethnic diversity, share
of government employment, percentage of population with a college degree.
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Table 3.6: OLS Regression of STATE AVG and Income Inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DEP VARIABLE Panel 1976-2002 Cross-section 1976-2002
VARIABLES state avg state avg state avg state avg state avg state avg
Top 10% 0.168*** 0.418
(0.030) (0.264)
Top 1% 0.113*** 0.214**
(0.015) (0.096)
Gini 0.527*** 0.864**
(0.049) (0.385)
ln edu -0.227*** -0.226*** -0.234*** -0.215*** -0.220*** -0.235***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.065) (0.061) (0.054)
ln ethnic 0.068*** 0.070*** 0.072*** 0.068*** 0.058*** 0.055***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.112) (0.095) (0.103)
ln govemp sh 0.236*** 0.259*** 0.206*** 0.300*** 0.330*** 0.238***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.094) (0.091) (0.076)
Year FE yes yes yes no no no
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,296 1,296 1,296 48 48 48
R-squared 0.489 0.497 0.527 0.512 0.522 0.569
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: *** ,** , * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respec-
tively. Constants are included in the model but not reported. Robust standard errors in
brackets. All columns include region and time fixed- effects. The dependent variable (in
logs) in all columns is the state time-series average corruption per 100,000 population from
1976-2002. The independent variables are top 10% income share, top 1% income share,
and Gini from 1984-2002 respectively. Control variables include ethnic diversity, share of
government employment, percentage of population with a college degree. Column 1-3 is a
panel OLS and column 4-6 is a cross-section OLS for the time period 1976-2002.
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Table 3.7: OLS Regression of PERCEPTION on Income Inequality from 1976-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DEP VARIABLE Panel 1976-2002 Cross-section 1976-2002
VARIABLES avg percep avg percep avg percep avg percep avg percep avg percep
Top 10% 0.254** 0.864
(0.101) (0.843)
Top 1% -0.002 0.074
(0.047) (0.334)
Gini -1.523*** -2.527**
(0.139) (0.981)
ln edu -0.617*** -0.632*** -0.644*** -0.571** -0.616** -0.623***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.039) (0.245) (0.242) (0.218)
ln ethnic 1.008*** 1.054*** 1.230*** 0.921** 1.030** 1.362***
(0.076) (0.077) (0.071) (0.430) (0.455) (0.407)
ln govemp sh -0.127** -0.166*** -0.150*** -0.087 -0.166 -0.186
(0.056) (0.057) (0.052) (0.335) (0.347) (0.318)
Year FE yes yes yes no no no
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,215 1,215 1,215 45 45 45
R-squared 0.437 0.434 0.484 0.447 0.436 0.514
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Constants are included in the model but not reported. Robust standard errors in brackets.
All columns include region and time fixed- effects. The dependent variable in all columns is the
perception-based corruption measure from Boylan and Long (2003) for the year 1999. The inde-
pendent variables are top 10% income share, top 1% income share, and Gini respectively. Control
variables include ethnic diversity, share of government employment, percentage of population with a
college degree.
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Table 3.8: IV 2SLS of Corruption on Top Income Inequality 1984-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DEP VARIABLE CONVICTION
Top 1% 0.325***
(0.121)
Top 0.5% 0.272***
(0.103)
Top 0.1% 0.210**
(0.0818)
Top 0.01% 0.173**
(0.0698)
ln govemp sh 0.291*** 0.324*** 0.310*** 0.293***
(0.0840) (0.0838) (0.0807) (0.0765)
ln ethnic 0.0518** 0.0566** 0.0638*** 0.0703***
(0.0237) (0.0224) (0.0205) (0.0189)
ln edu -0.227** -0.224*** -0.221*** -0.217***
(0.0402) (0.0409) (0.0409) (0.0409)
Observations 720 720 720 720
R-squared 0.247 0.248 0.244 0.241
Hansen J statistic 0.592 2.252 2.757 3.153
χ2 p-value 0.7437 0.320 0.2519 0.2067
Shea Partial -R square 0.0873 0.1999 0.211 0.219
F-test (first-stage) of excluded instruments 46.038 45.381 49.80 53.83
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: *** ,** , * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Constants are included in the model but not reported. Robust standard errors in brackets.
All columns include region and time fixed- effects. The dependent variable in column 1-3
is the conviction-based corruption measure 100,000 population. The independent variables
are top 1%, top 0.5%, top 0.1%, top 0.01% income share respectively. Control variables
include ethnic diversity, share of government employment, percentage of population with a
college degree. Instruments include slave share in 1860, mature cohort size as a ratio 40−59
15−69
age group, and log income in 1970. F-test ( Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald in STATA ) tests the
joint significance of the instruments from the first- stage regression. Shea- partial R-square
denotes the intercorrelation among instruments. Hansen J-stat is an overidentification test.
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Table 3.9: IV 2SLS of Corruption on Gini, top 10%
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES STATE AVG STATE AVG STATE AVG
Top 10% 0.303***
(0.0654)
Top 1% 0.182***
(0.0344)
Gini 0.316***
(0.0716)
ln pop 0.0125*** 0.0139*** 0.0140***
(0.00214) (0.00234) (0.00212)
ln ethnic 0.250*** 0.228*** 0.296***
(0.0273) (0.0280) (0.0193)
ln govemp sh 0.230*** 0.294*** 0.176***
(0.0298) (0.0395) (0.0182)
ln edu -0.231*** -0.233*** -0.236***
(0.0114) (0.0119) (0.0117)
Observations 1,040 1,040 1,040
R-squared 0.615 0.577 0.598
Hansen J statistic 5.818 0.371 4.249
χ2 p-value 0.0545 0.8306 0.1195
Shea Partial -R square 0.0622 0.046 0.0891
F-test (first-stage) of excluded instruments 33.094 25.809 54.793
Notes: *** ,** , * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Constants are included in the model but not reported. Robust standard errors in brackets. All
columns include region and time fixed- effects. The dependent variable in all columns is the
state time-series average corruption per 100,000 population from 1976-2002. Data obtained
from Glaeser and Saks (2006). The independent variables are top 10% , top 1%, and Gini
respectively. Control variables include ethnic diversity, share of government employment,
percentage of population with a college degree, and population. Instruments include slave
share in 1860, mature cohort size as a ratio 40−59
15−69 age group, log income in 1970. F-test (
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald in STATA ) tests the joint significance of the instruments from the
first-stage regression. Shea- partial R-square denotes the intercorrelation among instruments.
Hansen J-stat is an overidentification test.
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Table 3.10: IV 2SLS of Corruption on top income inequality 1984-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DEP VARIABLE CONVICTION
Top 1% 0.318*** 0.340*** 0.304**
(0.121) (0.125) (0.124)
Top 0.1% 0.207** 0.208** 0.194**
(0.0817) (0.0860) (0.0830)
ln govemp sh 0.342*** 0.326*** 0.354*** 0.331*** 0.331*** 0.313***
(0.0872) (0.0834) (0.0814) (0.0793) (0.0879) (0.0839)
ln ethnic 0.0552** 0.0663*** 0.0455** 0.0601*** 0.0548** 0.0662***
(0.0235) (0.0204) (0.0231) (0.0202) (0.0244) (0.0212)
ln edu -0.230*** -0.236*** -0.238*** -0.248*** -0.216*** -0.223***
(0.0424) (0.0426) (0.0505) (0.0497) (0.0420) (0.0421)
Mining -0.294 -0.255
(0.229) (0.227)
Finance 0.174 0.187
(0.236) (0.233)
Oil & Gas -0.194 -0.162
(0.247) (0.245)
Observations 720 720 720 720 663 663
R-squared 0.251 0.247 0.246 0.246 0.256 0.250
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: *** ,** , * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respec-
tively. Constants are included in the model but not reported. Robust standard errors in
brackets. All columns include region and time fixed- effects. The dependent variable in all
columns is the state time-series average corruption per 100,000 population from 1976-2002.
Data obtained from Glaeser and Saks (2006). The independent variables are top 1% , top
0.1%, and Gini respectively. Control variables include ethnic diversity, share of government
employment, percentage of population with a college degree, and population. Instruments
include slave share in 1860, mature cohort size as a ratio 40−59
15−69 age group, log income in 1970.
F-test ( Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald in STATA ) tests the joint significance of the instruments
from the first-stage regression. Shea- partial R-square denotes the intercorrelation among
instruments. Hansen J-stat is an overidentification test.
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Table 3.11: IV 2SLS of Corruption on Gini 1984-2002
(1) (2)
VARIABLES CONVICTION CONVICTION
Top 10% 0.935***
(0.337)
Gini 1.386***
(0.526)
ln govemp sh 0.349*** 0.200***
(0.0930) (0.0537)
ln ethnic 0.0231 0.0556**
(0.0327) (0.0219)
ln edu -0.201*** -0.214***
(0.0417) (0.0407)
Observations 720 720
R-squared 0.223 0.231
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Hansen J statistic 1.038 2.045
χ2 p-value 0.5952 0.3597
Shea Partial -R square 0.1871 0.0686
F-test (first-stage) of excluded instruments 22.04 21.83
Notes: *** ,** , * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent lev-
els, respectively. Constants are included in the model but not reported. Robust
standard errors in brackets. All columns include region and time fixed- effects.
The dependent variable in column 1-3 is the conviction-based corruption measure
100,000 population. The independent variables are top 10% income share, top 1%
income share, and Gini respectively. Control variables include ethnic diversity,
share of government employment, percentage of population with a college degree,
population. Instruments include slave share in 1860, mature cohort size as a ratio
40−59
15−69 age group, and log income in 1970. F-test ( Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald in
STATA ) tests the joint significance of the instruments from the first- stage re-
gression. Shea- partial R-square denotes the intercorrelation among instruments.
Hansen J-stat is an overidentification test.
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